Monetary Recoveries for State Crime Victims by Parness, Jeffrey A. et al.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2010
Monetary Recoveries for State Crime Victims
Jeffrey A. Parness
Northern Illinois University College of Law
Edmund Laube
Laura Lee
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jeffrey A. Parness, Edmund Laube, and Laura Lee, Monetary Recoveries for State Crime Victims , 58 Clev. St. L. Rev. 819 (2010)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss4/5
  
 
819 
MONETARY RECOVERIES FOR STATE CRIME 
VICTIMS 
JEFFREY A. PARNESS,∗ LAURA LEE,∗ & EDMUND LAUBE∗ 
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 820 
 II. CONTENTS AND ENFORCEMENT OF STATE  
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIME VICTIM RECOVERIES.................... 821 
A. Contents ....................................................................... 821 
B. Enforcement................................................................. 826 
1. Alaska................................................................... 826 
2. New Jersey ........................................................... 827 
3. Wisconsin ............................................................. 828 
4. Nebraska............................................................... 829 
5. California.............................................................. 830 
6. Arizona ................................................................. 831 
 III. STATUTORY APPROACHES TO CRIME VICTIM  
RECOVERIES ........................................................................ 832 
A. Introduction ................................................................. 832 
B. Terminology................................................................... 17 
C. Civil Claim Recoveries .................................................. 23 
D. Administrative and Special Court Recoveries ............... 24 
E. Criminal Case Recoveries ............................................. 32 
F. Enforcing Monetary Recoveries for Crime Victims ...... 41 
1. Government Failures to Enforce Recoveries.......... 41 
2. Criminal Defendant’s Inability to Pay.................... 43 
G. The Effects of Forfeitures on Crime Victim  
Recoveries...................................................................... 46 
 IV. SECURING BETTER MONETARY RECOVERIES FOR CRIME 
VICTIMS................................................................................. 57 
 V. CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 62 
 
                                                          
∗
 Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinois University College of Law and Visiting Professor of 
Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago; B.A., Colby College, J.D., The University of 
Chicago Law School. 
 
∗
 B.A., Purdue University and J.D., Northern Illinois University College of Law. 
 
∗
 B.A., University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign and J.D., Northern Illinois University 
College of Law. 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
820 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:819 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Every year about twenty million Americans are crime victims.1  More than 
sixteen million are victims of crimes involving property.2  Many criminal code 
victims (and many others undesignated as victims under the criminal laws) suffer 
personal injury as well as other readily ascertainable losses.  Crimes often involve 
state statutes that are only enforceable in state courts.  For all state crime victims, 
there is typically an array of avenues to monetary recoveries for related losses.  
These are chiefly provided by constitutions, statutes, and common law rulings.  
Unfortunately, many victims go without recovery even when assets are or may be 
available.  Are there better ways to secure recoveries for losses resulting from 
crimes?  
Recoveries typically are available through three avenues: a criminal case (with or 
without a formal charge); a related civil case (including a presuit settlement); and a 
related administrative or special court proceeding.  A single crime victim may 
employ more than one avenue, at times simultaneously.   
This paper examines the three avenues of recoveries available to state crime 
victims, though it also briefly explores recoveries in the federal courts.  State crime 
victim recovery avenues often are, and should be, broader than recovery avenues 
available in federal courts.  While there are currently no express federal 
constitutional crime victim rights, many state constitutions expressly recognize at 
least some such rights, including recovery rights.3  While certain state constitutional 
crime victim recovery rights are largely, if not exclusively, dependent upon enabling 
legislation, others are not.4  Explicit state constitutional recognition of crime victim 
recovery should at least elevate crime victim interests when legislatures and courts 
act. 
Broader state crime victim recovery avenues are also generally more available 
because unlike federal district courts, they are not limited by subject matter 
jurisdictional constraints.  Article III of the Constitution leaves many recovery 
claims, involving both federal and state crimes, outside federal court authority.  State 
trial court jurisdictional authority typically is unlimited.   
Because of the breadth and availability of state recovery avenues, crime victims 
often utilize them even for federal law crimes.  First of all, diversity of citizenship 
and amount in controversy requirements for the Article III courts often are not met 
where there are federal crimes.  Furthermore, any supplemental authority in the 
federal courts is discretionary and has been largely unrecognized in federal statutes.5  
There is also no explicit federal legislation on Article III court jurisdiction involving 
many crime victim recoveries tied to federal crimes.  By contrast, most state trial 
courts enjoy expansive jurisdictional authority, including subject matter authority 
                                                          
 
1
 MICHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: 
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2008, at 1 (2009) (21,312,400 people). 
 
2
 Id. (16,455,890 people). 
 
3
 Infra Part II.A. 
 
4
 Infra Part III.A. 
 
5
 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West 2010). 
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over recoveries sought by federal crime victims.  For example, the Illinois circuit 
courts are constitutionally vested with jurisdiction over “all justiciable matters.”6 
The broader avenues for crime victim recoveries in state courts are also 
facilitated by procedures that could never be employed in the federal courts.  For 
example, the federal constitutional civil jury trial right that applies in federal district 
courts does not operate in state courts.7  State constitutional civil jury trial 
procedures at times do not follow federal practices.  Even when the state 
constitutional language on civil juries appears comparable to the Seventh 
Amendment federal civil jury trial right, state constitutional civil jury trials may be 
conducted differently in both large and small ways.8   
In this Article, we explore the constitutional, statutory, and common law 
foundations of the three recovery avenues available to crime victims.  We also 
explore the federal-state and interstate differences in these avenues, along with the 
associated barriers to recovery.  Finally, we propose better ways in which to 
facilitate state crime victim recoveries. 
II.  CONTENTS AND ENFORCEMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CRIME VICTIM 
RECOVERIES 
A.  Contents 
In contrast to the federal Constitution, several American state constitutions 
address crime victim recoveries.  The Louisiana Constitution provides for “the right 
to seek restitution.”9  In the Rhode Island Constitution, there is a right for a “victim 
of crime . . . to receive, from the perpetrator of the crime, financial compensation.”10  
In South Carolina, “victims of crime” have a right to “prompt and full restitution 
from the person or persons convicted.”11  The California Constitution says: “It is the 
unequivocal intention of the People . . . that all persons who suffer losses as a result 
of criminal activity shall have the right to seek and secure restitution from the 
persons convicted . . . [for] losses they suffer.”12  It further provides that 
“[r]estitution shall be ordered . . . in every case . . . in which a crime victim suffers a 
loss.”13  In Rhode Island,14 Wisconsin,15 Texas,16 and Georgia17 there are 
                                                          
 
6
 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9.  See also IND. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (“The Circuit Courts shall 
have such civil and criminal jurisdiction as may be prescribed by law.”). 
 
7
 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1876). 
 
8
 This is because of differences such as the amount in controversy, the number of jurors 
needed, and the need for unanimity.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VII ($20); HAWAII CONST. 
art. I, § 13 ($5000); People v. Lobb, 161 N.E.2d 325, 331 (Ill. 1959) (requiring unanimity and 
twelve jurors); Colgrove v. Barrin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) (requiring six jurors); OR. 
CONST. art. VII, § 5 (three-fourths of jury may render verdict).  
 
9
 LA. CONST. art. I, § 25. 
 
10
 R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
 
11
 S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24.   
 
12
 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(13)(A).   
 
13
 Id. § 28(b)(13)(B).  See also ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(8) (“To preserve and protect 
victims’ rights to justice and due process, a victim of crime has a right . . . [t]o receive prompt 
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constitutional provisions on crime victim “compensation” available from state funds.  
As these examples show, recoveries by crime victims under American state 
constitutions may apply in civil cases, criminal cases, as well as administrative 
proceedings that may involve payments made by the state rather than the criminals. 
State constitutions vary on who constitutes a crime victim entitled to possible 
recoveries.  Some states, such as California,18 Illinois,19 Texas,20 and Wisconsin,21 
broadly recognize crime victim recoveries by not expressly limiting them to those 
hurt by convicted criminals.  Other states, such as Arizona22 and Oklahoma,23 have 
narrower constitutional provisions that make recovery only available from those 
                                                          
restitution from the person or persons convicted of the criminal conduct that caused the 
victim’s loss or injury.”). 
 
14
 R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“A victim of crime shall, as a matter of right . . . be entitled to 
receive, from the perpetrator of the crime, financial compensation for any injury or loss 
caused by the perpetrator of the crime, and shall receive such other compensation as the state 
may provide.”). 
 
15
 WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (“This state shall ensure that crime victims have all of the 
following privileges and protections as provided by law . . . [including] restitution [and] 
compensation . . . .”). 
 
16
 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 31(a)-(b) (“The compensation to victims of crime fund created by 
general law and the compensation to victims of crime auxiliary fund created by general law 
are each a separate dedicated account . . . . [M]oney deposited to the credit of the 
compensation to victims of crime fund or the compensation to victims of crime auxiliary fund 
. . . may be expended as provided by law only for delivering or funding victim-related 
compensation, services, or assistance.”). 
 
17
 GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 6(f) (“The General Assembly shall be authorized to 
allocate certain funds, to appropriate funds, to provide for a continuing fund, or to provide for 
any combination thereof for the purpose of compensating innocent victims of crime and for 
the administration of any laws enacted for such purpose.”). 
 
18
 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(13) (“a victim shall be entitled to . . . restitution”). 
 
19
 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(10) (“Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have . . . [t]he 
right to restitution.”). 
 
20
 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30 (“A crime victim has . . . the right to restitution.”). 
 
21
 WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (“This state shall ensure that crime victims have all the 
following privileges and protections as provided by law . . . restitution [and] 
compensation . . . .”). 
 
22
 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(8) (“[A] victim of crime has a right . . . [t]o receive 
prompt restitution from the person or persons convicted of the criminal conduct that caused 
the victim’s loss or injury.”).  See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2401 (2010) (victims can 
collect from a compensation fund). 
 
23
 OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34 (“[A]ny victim or family member of a victim of a crime has 
the right . . . to be awarded restitution by the convicted person for damages or losses . . . .”).  
See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142.1 (West 2010) (victims can collect from a 
compensation fund). 
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convicted, thereby making preindictment and many postindictment settlements of 
crime victim claims more difficult.24   
There are further distinctions between states on who constitutes a crime victim.  
Some state constitutions, as in Arizona25 and Rhode Island,26 employ the term 
“victim” without recognizing in the legislature express definitional authority.  By 
contrast, in other states the General Assembly is empowered to define the victims 
entitled to constitutional crime victim recovery.27  
The Oklahoma Constitution expressly includes family members as victims 
entitled to restitution.28  Other states more narrowly define eligible victims.  In New 
Jersey29 and New Mexico,30 the state constitutional definitions encompass only 
certain crimes or only certain victims.  The Louisiana Constitution employs a broad 
                                                          
 
24
 At times, whether only convicted criminals are contemplated is unclear to us.  See 
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (“Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have . . . the right to 
restitution from the accused . . . .”); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 (“A crime victim, as defined by 
statute, has the . . . right[] . . . [t]o restitution, as provided by law, from the person committing 
the offense that caused the victim’s loss.”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35 (“[V]ictims shall be 
entitled to . . . [t]he right to restitution from the offender.”). 
 
25
 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(C) (“‘Victim’ means a person against whom the criminal 
offense has been committed or, if the person is killed or incapacitated, the person’s spouse, 
parent, child or other lawful representative, except if the person is in custody for an offense or 
is the accused.”). 
 
26
 R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“A victim of crime shall, as a matter of right, be treated by 
agents of the state with dignity, respect and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice 
process.  Such person shall be entitled to receive, from the perpetrator of the crime, financial 
compensation for any injury or loss caused by the perpetrator of the crime, and shall receive 
such other compensation as the state may provide.”). 
 
27
 See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (“[c]rime victims, as defined by law”); CONN. CONST. 
art. I, § 8 (“a [crime] victim, as the General Assembly may define by law”); IDAHO CONST. art. 
I, § 22 (“[a] crime victim, as defined by statute”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1 (“[c]rime victims, as 
defined by law”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24 (“[c]rime victims, as defined by law”); MO. 
CONST. art. I, § 32 (“crime victims, as defined by law”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (“[c]rime 
victims, as defined by law”).   
 
28
 OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34 (“[A]ny victim or family member of a victim has the right . . . 
to be awarded restitution . . . .”). 
 
29
 N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22 (“For the purposes of this paragraph, ‘victim of a crime’ means: 
(a) a person who has suffered physical or psychological injury or has incurred loss of or 
damage to personal or real property as a result of a crime or an incident involving another 
person operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and (b) the 
spouse, parent, legal guardian, grandparent, child or sibling of the decedent in the case of a 
criminal homicide.”). 
 
30
 N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24(A)(8) (“A victim of arson resulting in bodily injury, 
aggravated arson, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, dangerous use of explosives, 
negligent use of a deadly weapon, murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, 
kidnapping, criminal sexual penetration, criminal sexual contact of a minor, homicide by 
vehicle, great bodily injury by vehicle or abandonment or abuse of a child or that victim’s 
representative shall have the following rights as provided by law . . . the right to restitution 
from the person convicted of the criminal conduct that caused the victim’s loss or 
injury . . . .”). 
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definition of “victim” for the purposes of certain nonrecovery rights, but defers to 
the legislature for a definition of victims eligible for recoveries.31 
State constitutional provisions also vary on where a crime victim recovery right 
may be pursued.  As noted above, state-funded schemes are sometimes 
contemplated.  Some state constitutions declare a broad right to restitution, 
suggesting recoveries can be pursued in several different fora.  In Missouri, crime 
victims have the right to restitution, “which shall be enforceable in the same manner 
as any other civil cause of action, or as otherwise provided by law.”32  Other states, 
including Connecticut,33 Oregon,34 and Virginia,35 provide for express crime victim 
recovery rights only in criminal cases. 
Not all state constitutions that contain explicit nonrecovery rights, like rights 
regarding notices of proceedings36 and opportunities to present evidence,37 also 
contain provisions on crime victim recoveries.38  Thus, occasionally nonmonetary 
crime victim rights are constitutionally recognized without any recovery avenues 
being explicitly recognized.39  
                                                          
 
31
 LA. CONST. art. I, § 25 (“Any person who is a victim of crime shall be treated with 
fairness, dignity, and respect, and shall be informed of the rights accorded under this Section.  
As defined by law, a victim of crime shall have the right . . . to seek restitution . . . .”). 
 
32
 MO. CONST. art. I, § 32 (“Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have the following 
rights, as defined by law . . . [t]he right to restitution, which shall be enforceable in the same 
manner as any other civil cause of action, or as otherwise provided by law . . . .”). 
 
33
 CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8(b) (“In all criminal prosecutions, a victim, as the General 
Assembly may define by law, shall have the following rights . . . the right to restitution . . . .”). 
 
34
 OR. CONST. art. I, § 42 (“[T]he following rights are hereby granted to victims in all 
prosecutions for crimes and in juvenile court delinquency proceedings . . . the right to receive 
prompt restitution from the convicted criminal who caused the victim’s loss or injury . . . .”). 
 
35
 VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A (“That in criminal prosecutions, the victim . . . may be accorded 
. . . [t]he right to restitution . . . .”). 
 
36
 See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28 (“A victim of crime . . . shall have . . . [t]he right to be 
informed of all criminal court proceedings . . . .”). 
 
37
 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6.01(a) (“Crime victims, as defined by law or their 
lawful representatives, including the next of kin of homicide victims, are entitled to the 
right . . . to be heard when authorized, at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the 
extent that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the person accused of 
committing the crime.”). 
 
38
 See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16; IND. CONST. art. I, § 13.  Florida’s crime victim rights 
provision was the first in the nation.  William A. Buzzett & Deborah K. Kearney, 
Commentary to the 1988 and 1998 Amendments, FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16 (West Supp. 2010). 
 
39
 See ALA. CONST. art. I, §6.01(a) (providing only that crime victims are entitled to “the 
right to be informed, to be present, and to be heard when authorized, at all crucial stages of 
criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional 
rights of the person accused”); IND. CONST. art. I, § 13 (victim rights are found under the 
provision on the rights of the criminally accused:  “Victims of crime . . . shall have the right to 
be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect throughout the criminal justice process; and . . . 
to be informed of and present during public hearings and to confer with the 
prosecution . . . .”). 
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Some American state constitutions leave the details of crime victim recoveries to 
the legislature.40  Two constitutions expressly recognize a responsibility for crime 
victim restitution in the “Legislature, or the people by initiative or referendum.”41  
Although the Montana Constitution does not contain an explicit right to crime victim 
recovery, it does direct the legislature to provide “[l]aws for the punishment of 
crime” to be “founded on the principles of prevention, reformation, public safety, 
and restitution for victims.”42  By contrast, in Oregon the constitution is silent with 
respect to the role of the legislature in constitutional crime victim recovery.43   
Unlike many states where crime victims “shall have” or “shall be entitled to” 
certain rights,44 the constitutional provisions on crime victims rights in Wisconsin 
simply place duties regarding crime victims on the state.45  In Texas46 and Georgia47 
there are recognized legislative responsibilities for providing state funds to 
compensate crime victims.  In Virginia the constitution imposes affirmative duties 
on state employees, officers, and agents, regarding certain crime victim rights, but 
has permissive language regarding other rights, including restitution.48   
                                                          
 
40
 CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8 (restitution enforceable as “provided by law”); MO. CONST. art. 
I, § 32 (“Crime victims, as defined by law shall have the following rights, as defined by 
law . . . [t]he right to restitution, which shall be enforceable . . . as otherwise provided by 
law . . . .”). 
 
41
 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(D); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34(C). 
 
42
 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 28(1). 
 
43
 OR. CONST. art. I, § 42 (“the following rights are hereby granted to victims in all 
prosecutions for crimes and in juvenile court delinquency proceedings: . . . [t]he right to 
receive prompt restitution from the convicted criminal who caused the victim’s loss or 
injury”). 
 
44
 See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (“[c]rime victims, as defined by law, shall have the 
following rights”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b) (“a victim shall be entitled to the following 
rights”); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37 (“[v]ictims of crime, as prescribed by law, shall be entitled to 
the following basic rights”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35 (“[t]o preserve and protect the rights of 
victims of crime to justice and due process, victims shall be entitled to the following basic 
rights”). 
 
45
 WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (“This state shall treat crime victims, as defined by law, with 
fairness, dignity and respect for their privacy.  This state shall ensure that crime victims have 
all of the following privileges and protections as provided by law . . . .”). 
 
46
 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 31 (“The compensation to victims of crime fund created by general 
law and the compensation to victims of crime auxiliary fund created by general law are each a 
separate dedicated account in the general revenue fund. . . . [M]oney deposited to the credit of 
the compensation to victims of crime fund or the compensation to victims of crime auxiliary 
fund from any source may be expended as provided by law only for delivering or funding 
victim-related compensation, services, or assistance.”). 
 
47
 GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 6(f) (“General Assembly shall be authorized to allocate 
certain funds, to appropriate funds, to provide for a continuing fund, or to provide for any 
combination thereof for the purpose of compensating innocent victims of crime and for the 
administration of any laws enacted for such purpose.”). 
 
48
 VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A (“That in criminal prosecutions, the victim shall be accorded 
fairness, dignity and respect by the officers, employees and agents of the Commonwealth and 
its political subdivisions and officers of the courts and, as the General Assembly may define 
and provide by law, may be accorded rights to reasonable and appropriate notice, information, 
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As noted, many state constitutions accompany recovery rights with additional 
crime victim rights.  Accompanying nonrecovery rights include rights to be treated 
with fairness, respect, and dignity;49 to be present at certain proceedings;50 and to be 
heard, consulted or informed of the progress of the criminal case.51  
State constitutions without explicit crime victim recovery rights sometimes invite 
judicial construction.  Similar to the Ninth Amendment to the federal Constitution, a 
state constitution can leave open the possibility of a nonexplicit constitutional right,52 
meaning a judicially-recognized right.  The Arizona Constitution says: “The 
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights for victims shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others granted by the Legislature or retained by victims.”53   
A few American state constitutions recognize particularly strong crime victim 
recovery rights.  Although the Idaho Constitution grants its legislature “the power to 
enact laws to define, implement, preserve, and expand the rights guaranteed to 
victims,” it also says that the constitutional rights “shall be self-enacting.”54  Without 
a self-execution clause and with some room for legislation, the Rhode Island 
Constitution declares that a “victim of crime . . . shall be entitled to receive, from the 
perpetrator of the crime, financial compensation for any injury or loss caused by the 
perpetrator . . . and shall receive such other compensation as the state may 
provide.”55  The California Constitution provides that crime victims, as a matter of 
right, receive some priority, stating that “[a]ll monetary payments, monies, and 
property collected . . . shall be first applied to pay the amounts ordered as restitution 
to the victim.”56 
B.  Enforcement 
Most American high courts have not significantly considered their own state 
constitutional provisions on crime victim recoveries.  Thus, many enforcement 
issues remain uncertain.  Courts have, however, considered enforcement of other 
express constitutional crime victim rights.  The results have varied.  
1.  Alaska 
The Alaska Court of Appeals rejected a criminal defendant’s challenge to his 
conviction based, inter alia, on the presence of the witness/crime victim in the 
                                                          
restitution, protection, and access to a meaningful role in the criminal justice process. These 
rights may include, but not be limited to . . . [t]he right to restitution . . . .”). 
 
49
 See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34(A). 
 
50
 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, §24 (when the accused has the right to be present). 
 
51
 See, e.g., TENN. CONST. art. I, §35. 
 
52
 The Ninth Amendment states that the “enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights” should not be construed “to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. IX. 
 
53
 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(E). 
 
54
 IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22(10). 
 
55
 R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
 
56
 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28. 
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courtroom.57  Her presence was founded on article I, section 24 of the Alaska 
Constitution, which says: “Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have . . . the right 
. . . to be present at all criminal or juvenile proceedings where the defendant has the 
right to be present.”58  The criminal defendant argued that the provision was not self-
executing and (at the time of his trial) had no implementing legislation.59  The 
appellate court found no error.60 
The court cited an Alaska constitutional provision saying that “to the extent 
possible, all provisions of this constitution shall be construed to be self-executing.”61  
While the court recognized that the constitutional language, “‘crime victim’ by 
‘law’” and the “rights ‘as provided by law,’” did authorize “the legislature to enact 
procedures to govern crime victims’ exercise of the listed rights—and perhaps to 
define the scope of those rights in particular situations,”62 the court nevertheless 
found the person before it was clearly a “victim” of the defendant’s crimes having 
the constitutional right to be present since the defendant had the right to be present.63  
The court declared that the case at hand was “one of the ‘core’ situations described” 
in the Alaska Constitution, making implementing legislation unnecessary.64  Thus, 
core attributes of the constitutional right to crime victim recovery65 might also be 
judicially defined in Alaska even when there is no legislation. 
2.  New Jersey 
A somewhat different issue involving a crime victim’s presence at a criminal 
proceeding was resolved, in part, on constitutional grounds in New Jersey two years 
earlier.66  There, the trial court held that a juvenile victim had standing to oppose a 
newspaper’s request to be present at the trial of another juvenile charged with sexual 
assault.67  The court ruled that because press access would result in “specific harm to 
the victim,” the press could not be present.68  The court utilized the state 
constitutional Victims’ Rights Amendment, which says not only that “[a] victim of a 
crime shall be entitled to those rights and remedies as may be provided by the 
Legislature,” but also that the victim has the right to be “treated with fairness, 
                                                          
 
57
 Landon v. Alaska, No. A-6479, 1999 WL 46543, at *1 (Alaska. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1999). 
 
58
 Id. at *2 
 
59
 Id. 
 
60
 Id. at *2-3. 
 
61
 Id. (citing ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 9). 
 
62
 Id. 
 
63
 Id. 
 
64
 Id. 
 
65
 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (“Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have the following 
rights as provided by law . . . the right to restitution from the accused”). 
 
66
 State ex rel. K.P., 709 A.2d 315 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997). 
 
67
 Id. at 322. 
 
68
 Id. at 328. 
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compassion and respect by the criminal justice system.”69  The court concluded that 
the latter, a “fundamental right,” supported a finding of “an unarticulated right to 
oppose a petition by the press,”70 especially as the victim had shown sufficient 
potential harm to justify closure.71  The New Jersey Constitution is silent on crime 
victim recovery. 
3.  Wisconsin 
By contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the opening sentence of 
its constitutional crime victim rights provision, guaranteeing “crime victims, as 
defined by law,” treatment “with fairness, dignity and respect,” was merely a 
“statement of purpose” describing “the policies to be promoted by the State” and, as 
such, offered no enforceable, self-executing rights.72  Thus, the provision could not 
be used by the Crime Victims Rights Board to justify a private reprimand of a 
district attorney for causing harm to the crime victim’s family by playing a 
particularly traumatic 911 tape at a sentencing hearing.73 
The Wisconsin court considered three sources for constitutional interpretation: 
“the plain meaning of the words in the context used; the constitutional debates and 
the practices in existence at the time of the writing of the constitution; and the 
earliest interpretation of the provision by the legislature as manifested in the first law 
passed following adoption.”74   
As to plain meaning, the court compared the broad language of the opening 
sentence with the “detailed list of privileges and protections” in the following 
sentences,75 concluding that the differences suggested the first sentence was merely a 
“general guide.”76  Next, as to constitutional debates, the court noted that the 
legislature had removed the language on fairness, dignity and respect “from the list 
of enumerated rights.”77  With regard to existing practices, the court observed that 
the two-part structure of a preexisting statute, with a broad opening statement 
followed by specifically enumerated rights, was followed in the constitution.78  The 
court concluded that the reason for constitutionalizing already existing statutory 
                                                          
 
69
 Id. at 321.  See also N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22 (“A victim of crime shall not be denied the 
right to be present at public judicial proceedings except when, prior to completing testimony 
as a witness, the victim is properly sequestered in accordance with law . . . .”). 
 
70
 Id. at 322. 
 
71
 Id. at 328. 
 
72
 Schilling v. Wisconsin, 692 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Wis. 2005) (examining WIS. CONST. art. 
I, § 9m). 
 
73
 Id. 
 
74
 Id. at 627. 
 
75
 Id. at 628. 
 
76
 Id. 
 
77
 Id. at 629. 
 
78
 Id. 
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rights was to ensure the rights permanently.79  Thus, the constitutional provision 
“was adopted to give weight to” the crime victim statute, but not to change it.80 
Finally, the Wisconsin court considered the “first significant law passed” 
following the constitutional amendment.81  While this law created a new section of 
specifically enumerated rights, it placed fairness and dignity concerns in another 
section called “Legislative intent,”82 suggesting the two sections were to be handled 
differently by the courts.  Only the section on enumerated rights delegated to the 
judiciary the power to create remedies.83  The court concluded there was no 
“enforceable, self-executing right” regarding “fairness, dignity and respect.”84  
Regarding crime victim recoveries, the Wisconsin Constitution says that the 
“state shall ensure that crime victims have all the following privileges and 
protections as provided by law,” including “restitution” and “compensation.”85  
Notwithstanding this mandate for legislative assurance, constitutional crime victim 
recovery rights in Wisconsin may nevertheless depend on the precise statutory 
language. 
4.  Nebraska 
The Nebraska Supreme Court similarly held that its constitutional provision 
recognizing that a crime victim has the “right to be informed of, be present at, and 
make an oral or written statement at sentencing, parole, pardon, commutation, and 
conditional release proceedings” was not self-executing.86  Thus, a crime victim was 
denied the right to be heard at a Board of Pardons commutation proceeding.87  The 
Nebraska decision differed from the Wisconsin ruling in that the Nebraska “right” 
(to make a statement) was more individual or personal than the Wisconsin 
admonition on state responsibility (to treat with fairness).  However, the Nebraska 
court also focused on the role of the legislature, noting the constitutional declaration 
that the “Legislature shall provide by law for the implementation of the rights 
granted in this section” and that there “shall be no remedies other than as specifically 
provided by the Legislature for the enforcement of the rights granted.”88  The court 
rejected the argument that a statute generally providing for civil liability for anyone 
who “causes . . . any citizen . . . the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by . . . the 
                                                          
 
79
 Id. at 631. 
 
80
 Id. 
 
81
 Id. 
 
82
 Id. 
 
83
 Id. (providing that remedies are required constitutionally “only for violations of the 
‘privileges and protections’ enumerated in the second sentence of Article I, Section 9m of the 
Wisconsin Constitution”). 
 
84
  Id. at 632. 
 
85
 WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m. 
 
86
 State ex rel. Lamm v. Nebraska Bd. of Pardons, 620 N.W.2d 763, 768-69 (Neb. 2001) 
(citing NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28). 
 
87
 Id. at 763. 
 
88
 Id. at 768-69. 
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Constitution . . . of the State of Nebraska” afforded the crime victim a right to a 
remedy for violation of the statement right.89  The court succinctly concluded: 
A constitutional provision is not self-executing if such provision merely 
indicates a line of policy or principles without supplying the means by 
which such policy or principles are to be carried into effect, if the 
language of the constitutional provision is directed to the Legislature, or if 
the language of a constitutional provision indicates that subsequent 
legislation is contemplated or necessary for effectuation of such 
provision.90 
In Nebraska, a crime victim has a constitutional right “to be informed of all 
criminal court proceedings.”91  This alone seems inadequate to support a 
constitutionally-based crime victim recovery right unattached to statute. 
5.  California 
A similar result was reached in California where a crime victim had not been 
notified of a sentencing hearing even though he had a statutory right to notice of and 
“to attend all sentencing proceedings.”92  The victim argued that a resulting 
probation order should be set aside, relying, in part, upon Article I, Section 28 of the 
California Constitution, which includes “a bill of rights for victims of crime” that 
encompasses not only the right to restitution, but also “the more basic expectation 
that persons who commit felonious acts causing injury to innocent victims will be 
appropriately detained . . . and sufficiently punished.”93  The court found that the 
constitutional and statutory language was “directory, as distinguished from 
mandatory.”94  It observed there were “[n]o procedures to enforce the duty of 
                                                          
 
89
 Id. 
 
90
 Id. at 769.  A Nebraska Attorney General Opinion reviewed Nebraska case law, finding 
the constitutional assurances as to “free instruction in the common schools” are not self-
executing.  Student Fees and the Right to Free Instruction in Public Schools, No. 02004 Op. 
Neb. Att’y Gen. (2002). 
 
91
 NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28 (“(1) A victim of a crime, as shall be defined by law, or his or 
her guardian or representative shall have: The right to be informed of all criminal court 
proceedings; the right to be present at trial unless the trial court finds sequestration necessary 
for a fair trial for the defendant; and the right to be informed of, be present at, and make an 
oral or written statement at sentencing, parole, pardon, commutation, and conditional release 
proceedings.  This enumeration of certain rights for crime victims shall not be construed to 
impair or deny others provided by law or retained by crime victims.  (2) The Legislature shall 
provide by law for the implementation of the rights granted in this section.  There shall be no 
remedies other than as specifically provided by the Legislature for the enforcement of the 
rights granted by this section.  (3) Nothing in this section shall constitute a basis for error in 
favor of a defendant in any criminal proceeding, a basis for providing standing to participate 
as party to any criminal proceeding, or a basis to contest the disposition of any charge.”). 
 
92
 People v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 154 Cal. App. 3d 319, 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 119.1 (West 2010) wherein the responsibility for notice is given to 
the probation officer). 
 
93
 Id. at 322. 
 
94
 Id. at 321-22. 
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notification or remedies for the failure to do so.”95  Therefore, the court denied the 
victim’s petition, concluding that it had “no authority to afford any relief.”96   
The constitutional restitution right in California is similar to the notice right.  A 
victim is entitled to restitution97 but there are “no procedures to enforce” remedies.98  
Thus, California is unlikely to support crime victim recovery without a statute. 
6.  Arizona 
A victim in Arizona was similarly left without relief when the Arizona Supreme 
Court refused to extend the right to be heard to a victim who wished to file litigation 
papers apart from the state.99  The case involved a criminal defendant’s petition for 
postconviction relief.100  In order to have her own right to file, the court said that the 
victim would need to be an aggrieved party.101  The court held that having the right 
to be heard did not make the victim an aggrieved party.102 
In coming to its conclusion, the Arizona court first looked to the constitutional 
language.  One provision grants crime victims the right “[t]o be heard at any 
proceeding involving a post-arrest release decision . . . [and] to be heard at any 
proceeding when any post-conviction release from confinement is being 
considered.”103  The court decided that the victim could not use the first part of this 
provision to support a right to file her own papers because it refers to “release” not 
“relief.”104  Since the proceeding concerned the defendant’s petition for post-
conviction relief105 and not post-conviction release, the court held the constitutional 
provision was inapplicable.106 
The court also rejected the victim’s argument that the second part, the right to be 
heard on matters of release, “includes the right to file her own separate petition.”107  
It reasoned that the right to be heard was not “clearly” defined, noting the enabling 
statute did not mention any right to file a separate petition.108  The statute only said 
                                                          
 
95
 Id. at 322. 
 
96
 Id.  But see Melissa J. v. Superior Court of Alameda Cnty., 190 Cal. App. 3d 476 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1987) (finding relief can be afforded a victim whose monthly restitution was halted 
by a court without notice of the hearing to the victim). 
 
97
 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28 (“victim shall be entitled to . . . restitution”). 
 
98
 Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 154 Cal. App. 3d at 322. 
 
99
 Arizona v. Lamberton, 899 P.2d 939 (Ariz. 1995). 
 
100
  Id. at 940. 
 
101
 Id. (citing ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.9). 
 
102
 Id. at 941. 
 
103
 Id. (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)). 
 
104
 Id. at 942. 
 
105
 Id. at 940 (based on cruel and unusual punishment). 
 
106
 Id. 
 
107
 Id. 
 
108
 Id. 
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that the victim had a “right to be notified of post-conviction review and appellate 
proceedings.”109    
Finally, the Arizona court found there was a way for the victim to be heard 
without filing a separate petition; it observed that the victim could be heard on 
appeal via the trial court record and that the state often voices victim interests in 
postconviction relief papers.110  The high court affirmed the dismissal of the victim’s 
separate petition.111 
In Arizona, crime victim recovery in a criminal case may need to depend upon 
state cooperation.  The constitution only says that responsibility for crime victim 
restitution is in the “legislature, or the people by initiative or referendum.”112  Yet, 
unlike in postconviction relief settings, the state in restitution settings may be less 
likely to voice victim interests.  This may be so because, as will be discussed later, 
restitution to the victim can interfere with forfeitures to the state. 
The above examples of varied state enforcement of crime victim rights illustrate 
that even where American state constitutions speak to crime victims recoveries, they 
typically would not secure significant enforceable rights in the absence of 
legislation.  It appears that legislation is more obligatory in states with constitutions 
directly alluding to such recoveries.  But ultimately, legislative discretion generally 
reigns.  We next examine statutes on crime victim recoveries in states with and 
without constitutional provisions. 
III.  STATUTORY APPROACHES TO CRIME VICTIM RECOVERIES  
A.  Introduction 
While several American state constitutions expressly recognize crime victim 
recoveries, such recoveries are typically limited by dependence on enabling 
legislation as well as by narrow definitions of relevant crimes and victims.  For 
example, the stated purpose of the New Mexico Victims of Crime Statute is “to 
assure that . . . the provisions of Article 2, Section 24 of the constitution of New 
Mexico are implemented.”113  By contrast, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin declared 
that its constitutional amendment on crime victims “was adopted to give weight to” 
preexisting statutory crime victim rights.114  However, because legislative schemes 
for crime victim recoveries have been generally implemented, explicit constitutional 
foundations are unnecessary.  Quite strong statutory crime victim recovery rights 
appear in several states with no express constitutional provisions.  For example, 
                                                          
 
109
 Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4411 (West 2010)). 
 
110
 Id. at 942. 
 
111
 Id. at 942-43. 
 
112
 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(D) (“The legislature, or the people by initiative or 
referendum, have the authority to enact substantive and procedural laws to define, implement, 
preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to victims by this section, including the authority to 
extend any of these rights to juvenile proceedings.”). 
 
113
 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-26-2(D) (West 2010). 
 
114
  Schilling, 692 N.W.2d at 631. 
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Indiana allows a victim standing115 to enforce the statutory right to pursue 
restitution.116  Some states mandate that government officials advise crime victims of 
available recovery schemes.117  Pennsylvania allows for the preservation of a 
criminal defendant’s assets in anticipation of a criminal case order involving victim 
restitution.118  
Whether or not constitutional provisions are in play, there are three major 
avenues to crime victim recoveries.  These are recoveries on civil claims, including 
in civil cases; recoveries from government through administrative or special court 
proceedings; and recoveries during criminal investigations or cases.119 
Constitutional120 and statutory121 provisions often recognize that crime victims 
can themselves pursue recoveries from convicted or alleged criminals, or from the 
criminally accused, in civil cases.122  Such provisions recognize private interests 
rather than the public interests that are normally associated with criminal case 
sentencing.   
                                                          
 
115
 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-40-2-1 (West 2010) (“A victim has standing to assert the rights 
established by this article.”).  In the federal courts, limited crime victim standing to enforce 
statutory rights has been criticized.  See Improving Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 7-10 
(2008) (statement of Paul G. Cassell, Professor) [hereinafter Cassell Testimony]. 
 
116
 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-40-5-7 (“A victim has the right to pursue an order of restitution 
and other civil remedies against the person convicted of a crime against the victim.”). 
 
117
 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.0021 (West 2010) (while there is no constitutional right to 
seek restitution in the Florida Constitution, “victims must be properly advised in the courts” of 
“the right . . . [t]o seek crimes compensation and restitution.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.02 
(West 2010) (a peace officer must notify a victim of the rights of crime victims “to apply for 
reparations to cover losses . . . resulting from a violent crime and the . . . right to request 
restitution.”). 
 
118
 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9728(e) (West 2010). 
 
119
  Far less legislation addresses crime victim recoveries in anticipation of possible later 
civil cases or during criminal investigations that precede any formal charges. 
 
120
 See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1 (“[A] victim of crime has a right . . . [t]o be present . . . 
[t]o confer with the prosecution [and] [t]o receive prompt restitution.”); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 
8(b) (West 2010) (“In all criminal prosecutions, a victim . . . shall have . . . the right to 
communicate with the prosecution . . . the right to restitution which shall be enforceable in the 
same manner as any other cause of action or as otherwise provided by law . . . .”); OKLA. 
CONST. art. II, § 34(A) (West 2010) (“[A] victim of crime has the right . . . to be awarded 
restitution by the convicted person for damages or losses as determined and ordered by the 
court . . . .”). 
 
121
 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.0021 (“[I]n order to ensure that crime victims can 
effectively understand and exercise their rights . . . victims must be properly advised . . . .  The 
courts may fulfill their obligation to advise crime victims by . . . [m]aking the following 
announcement . . . ‘[i]f you are the victim of a crime with a case pending before this court, 
you are advised that you have the right . . . [t]o seek crimes compensation and restitution.’”). 
 
122
 So even where there has not been, and will not be, a criminal case (and thus no one 
convicted or criminally accused), a victim harmed by the commission of a crime can pursue 
the alleged wrongdoer in a civil case.  When there is a criminal case, a crime victim may be 
able to pursue recovery from the criminally accused, or might have to wait until conviction. 
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Civil case recovery rights at times anticipate the use of a criminal case 
resolution.123  State statutory as well as constitutional provisions promote a crime 
victim’s recovery in a later civil case by recognizing the right of the victim to be 
heard during the criminal case,124 thereby possibly securing an established record of 
injuries.  Such provisions can also recognize a right to confer with the prosecution.125  
Similar rights have been statutorily recognized in the federal courts.126 
Crime victim recoveries in administrative or special court proceedings involving 
state funds also recognize private interests.  Awards occur outside criminal cases.  
Like civil cases, these awards can employ earlier criminal case outcomes.127 
Crime victim recoveries may also be ordered during criminal case sentencing.  
Only under some state statutes are such recoveries deemed restitution.128  At 
                                                          
 
123
 See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-28-5(a) (West 2010) (“Upon . . . final conviction of a 
felony after a trial by jury, a civil judgment shall automatically be entered . . . conclusively 
establishing . . . liability to the victim for any personal injury and/or loss . . . .”); id. § 12-28-
5.1 (“When the court orders a defendant to make financial restitution to the victim of a crime 
of which the defendant had been convicted or to which the defendant has pleaded guilty or 
nolo contendere, a civil judgment shall automatically be entered . . . against the defendant on 
behalf of the victim for that amount.”). 
 
124
 See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A (West 2010) (“That in criminal proceedings, the 
victim shall be accorded fairness, dignity and respect . . . and, as the General Assembly may 
define and provide by law, may be accorded rights to reasonable and appropriate notice, 
information, restitution, protection, and access to a meaningful role in the criminal justice 
process.  These rights may include . . . [t]he right to address the circuit court at the time 
sentence is imposed . . . [t]he right to restitution [and] the right to confer with the 
prosecution.”). 
 
125
 The right to confer with prosecution is the first named right in the victims’ rights section 
of the Tennessee Constitution.  TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35 (“To preserve and protect the rights 
of victims of crime to justice and due process, victims shall be entitled to the following basic 
rights . . . [t]he right to confer with the prosecution.”). 
 
126
 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a) (West 2010) (“A crime victim has the following rights 
. . . [t]he right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving 
release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding . . . [t]he reasonable right to confer with the 
attorney for the Government in the case.”). 
 
127
 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-6(b) (West 2010) (“Claims must be investigated . . . 
regardless of whether alleged criminal has been apprehended, prosecuted, or convicted . . . .”); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1018 (West 2010) (“The commission shall award compensation 
benefits . . . if satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence . . . .  Proof of conviction . . . is 
conclusive evidence that the crime was committed . . . .”).  
 
128
 But see HAW. REV. STAT. § 801D-4(d) (West 2010) (“Notwithstanding any law to the 
contrary, payment of restitution and judgments to victims, or surviving immediate family 
members of a victim, shall be a precondition for release on parole for any imprisoned person 
whom the Hawaii paroling authority determines has the financial ability to make complete or 
partial restitution payments or complete or partial judgment payments to the victim of the 
person’s crime, or to the surviving immediate family members of a victim.”); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 35-40-5-7 (West 2010) (“A victim has the right to pursue an order of restitution and other 
civil remedies against the person convicted of a crime against the victim.”); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 915.100 (West 2010) (“Victims . . . have the right to recover pecuniary damages,” with 
monetary remedies at sentencing; “[t]he right to restitution includes . . . [i]n all criminal cases 
in which there is a plea of guilty, verdict of guilty, or special verdict upon which a judgment 
of conviction is rendered, the sentencing court shall order that restitution be made by each 
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sentencing, crime victim recoveries secured from criminals chiefly satisfy public 
rather than private interests,129 as they promote punishment130 or rehabilitation131 
rather than compensation.  Because they are not meant to be fully compensatory, 
limited or no recoveries at sentencing generally cannot be challenged by crime 
victims.132  Furthermore, sentencing recovery orders usually cannot be “open-ended” 
deferrals and thus cannot be imposed without consideration of a criminal’s ability to 
pay,133 which is quite different from the guidelines on recoveries in civil cases. 
B.  Terminology 
One significant challenge in exploring the three avenues to crime victim recovery 
is terminology.  The same term, such as “restitution,” may be employed when 
speaking of the victim’s independent right to seek recovery in a civil court, the 
                                                          
offender to victims of the offender’s criminal activities.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.200(5) 
(West 2010) (“The court in which the conviction is had . . . may order restitution or give 
judgment . . . for reparation in damages . . . .”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-201 (2009) (“[T]he 
sentencing judge shall . . . require . . . full restitution to the victim . . . .”). 
 
129
 FRANK CARRINGTON & JAMES A. RAPP, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS: LAW AND LITIGATION § 
3.02[1] (1991) (“Orders of restitution . . . are primarily intended to serve the penal goals of the 
state: they are ‘sanctions’ imposed by the criminal justice system.”).  See also Matthew 
Dickman, Comment, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical Assessment of the Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act of 1996, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1701 (2009) (citing Burt Galaway, Toward 
the Rational Development of Restitution, in RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 77, 82 (Joe 
Hudson & Burt Galaway eds., 1977)). 
 
130
 See Rudd v. Florida, 543 So. 2d 819 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (trial court’s second 
restitution order imposed on the criminal defendant without the introduction of new evidence 
violated double jeopardy protections; “[r]estitution orders which are part of the sentence of 
community control are criminal in nature”); Iowa v. Mayberry, 415 N.W.2d 644, 646-47 
(Iowa 1987) (whether a restitution order at sentencing was “a fine, a civil claim, or a hybrid is 
not entirely clear,” but an order of restitution at sentencing is a fine for the purposes of the 
criminal defendant’s Eighth Amendment claim; the restitution order here was not excessive as 
it was reasonably related to the relevant damages). 
 
131
 See ALA. CODE § 15-18-68(a) (West 2010) (“In determining the manner, method, or 
amount of restitution to be ordered, the court may take into consideration . . . [t]he anticipated 
rehabilitative effect on the defendant regarding the manner of restitution or the method of 
payment.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-37-3(2) (West 2010) (“In determining whether to order 
restitution which may be complete, partial or nominal, the court shall taken into account . . . 
[t]he rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of 
payment.”). 
 
132
 See State v. Leingang, 763 N.W.2d 769, 773-74 (N.D. 2009) (after reviewing both 
federal and state cases, the court held that a victim could not challenge an order allowing a 
guilty plea withdrawal, though the guilty plea included an unpaid restitution order);  See also 
United States v. Rich, 603 F.3d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 2010) (abatement of criminal conviction 
due to defendant’s death while conviction was on appeal nullified the accompanying 
restitution order as it was “penal” as well as “compensatory”). 
 
133
 But see E.J. v. State, 1 So. 3d 251, 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing deferral 
orders tied to “certain specific events” occurring in the future can be made during criminal 
case sentencing). 
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victim’s right to recover from a government fund, and the victim’s ability to recover 
at a sentencing.134 
Further, the term “restitution” is used in both constitutions and statutes.  These 
two legal sources in a single state may not even be related.  In Arizona135 and 
Oklahoma,136 for example, a victim has the constitutional right to receive restitution 
from a person who has been convicted of a crime causing the victim’s injury in a 
context suggesting restitution involves recovery at sentencing.137  However, by 
statute a criminal court judge in Arizona must advise a crime victim that “[he or she 
has] rights . . . to receive restitution from a person who is convicted of causing [his 
or her] loss.”138  The statutory right to restitution appears to encompass recoveries 
outside of a sentencing order.  In Texas139 and Michigan,140 there is merely a 
constitutional “right to restitution,” with varying implementing statutes that, at times, 
mention both restitution and compensation.141  Florida, whose constitution has no 
                                                          
 
134
 See CARRINGTON & RAPP, supra note 129, § 3.02[3] n.17.  Of course, there are other 
challenges with the term restitution.  It has meaning, and prompts some confusion, in settings 
unrelated to crime victim recoveries.  See, e.g., Swain v. Cach, LLC, 699 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 
1115-16 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“At issue is whether Plaintiff may assert an independent cause of 
action for unjust enrichment.  Under California law, ‘[u]njust enrichment is not a cause of 
action . . . or even a remedy, but rather a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines 
and remedies.  It is synonymous with restitution.’ . . . Thus, unjust enrichment is a theory of 
recovery, not an independent legal claim.”). 
 
135
 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A) (“[A] victim of crime has a right: (1) To be treated with 
fairness . . . throughout the criminal justice process . . . (8) To receive prompt restitution from 
the person or persons convicted of the criminal conduct that caused the victim’s loss or 
injury.”). 
 
136
 OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34(A) (“To . . . ensure that victims are treated with fairness . . . 
throughout the criminal justice process . . . [t]he victim . . . has the right . . . to be awarded 
restitution by the convicted person for damages or losses as determined and ordered by the 
court . . . .”). 
 
137
 By contrast, the Missouri Constitution provides for “[t]he right to restitution, which 
shall be enforceable in the same manner as any other civil cause of action, or as otherwise 
provided by law . . . .”  MO. CONST. art. I, § 32. 
 
138
 Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4438 (2010), with id. § 13-603 (“If a person is 
convicted of an offense, the court shall require the convicted person to make restitution to the 
person who is the victim of the crime . . . .”).  The Restitution chapter of Arizona’s Criminal 
Code details the range of monetary remedies that can be ordered by the court.  See id. §§ 13-
801 to 13-806. 
 
139
 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a) (“A crime victim has the following rights: (1) . . . to be 
treated with fairness . . . throughout the criminal justice process . . . (4) the right to 
restitution . . . .”). 
 
140
 MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24(1) (“Crime victims . . . have . . . [t]he right to restitution.”). 
 
141
  The Texas Constitution says legislators “may enact laws to define the term victim and 
to enforce” the constitutional rights of crime victims.  TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(c).  In the 
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, under the heading Proceedings After Verdict, in the 
chapter regarding Judgment and Sentence:  
 
[T]he court that sentences a defendant convicted of an offense may order the 
defendant to make restitution to any victim of the offense . . . .  If the court does 
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explicit recognition of crime victim restitution, provides by statute for crime victim 
rights to both “restitution” and “compensation.”142  Monetary recoveries at 
sentencing governed solely by statutes are often, but not always, deemed 
“restitution.”143 
At least one state constitution explicitly provides many details on the 
“compensation” of crime victims through government funds.144  Other states that 
have constitutional145 or statutory146 rights to victim-initiated monetary recoveries 
also have statutory schemes in place or crime victim recoveries from the state.147  At 
times, a recovery from such a fund is deemed “restitution.”148  
In the federal courts, the term “restitution” encompasses both a victim’s right to 
recover at sentencing149 and an award against a criminal benefiting the federal 
government in order to support victim assistance and substance abuse programs.150 
                                                          
not order restitution or orders partial restitution . . . the court shall state . . . the 
reasons for not making the order or for the limited order.   
 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.037 (West 2010).  In the Texas Code of Criminal 
Procedure, under the heading Miscellaneous Proceedings, the chapter regarding Crime 
Victims’ Rights, “[a] victim . . . is entitled to . . . the right to be informed, when requested . . . 
concerning . . . restitution . . . [and] the right to receive information regarding compensation to 
victims of crime . . . .”  Id. art. 56.02.   
  By contrast, in the Michigan Constitution crime victims are defined by law, and their 
rights, including restitution, are “as provided by law” and rights enforcement “may” be 
provided for statutorily.  MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24. 
 
142
 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.0021 (West 2010) (“victims must be properly advised . . . [of the 
right] [t]o seek crimes compensation and restitution”). 
 
143
 Compare, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-101 (West 2010) (“‘Restitution’ means full or 
partial payment of pecuniary damage to a victim”), with ALA. CODE § 15-18-66 (West 2010) 
(“Full, partial or nominal payment of pecuniary damages to the victim or to its equivalent in 
services performed or work or labor done for the benefit of the victim as determined by the 
court of record.”).  See also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-111 (expressly recognizing a victim’s 
right to civil action if the victim is not satisfied with the criminal court’s restitution plan). 
 
144
 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 31 (“The compensation to victims of crime fund . . . and the 
compensation to victims of crime auxiliary fund . . . are each a separated dedicated 
account . . . [which] may be expended as provided by law only for delivering or funding 
victim-related compensation, services, or assistance.”). 
 
145
 See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34 (“[A]ny victim or family member of a victim of a 
crime has the right . . . to be awarded restitution by the convicted person for damages or losses 
as determined and ordered by the court . . . .”). 
 
146
 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.0021 (West 2010) (“[V]ictims must be properly advised . . . [of 
the right] [t]o seek crimes compensation and restitution.”). 
 
147
 See id. §§ 960.01-.28; 21 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 142.1-.20 (West 2010); TEX. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.31-.64 (West 2010). 
 
148
 Compare, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.0021 (“[V]ictims must be properly advised . . . 
[of the right] [t]o seek crimes compensation and restitution.”), with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
611A.51-611A.68 (West 2010) (administrative compensation awards through state supported 
funds is referred to as “victim reparation”). 
 
149
 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (West 2010) (“A crime victim has the following rights . . . [t]he 
right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, 
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Beside restitution, there are other challenging terms when examining crime 
victim recoveries.  Who qualifies as a “crime victim” entitled to recovery often 
differs in a single state depending upon context.  For example, the New Mexico 
Constitution expressly defines a crime victim who has both procedural and 
substantive rights in criminal cases as:  
A victim of arson resulting in bodily injury, aggravated arson, aggravated 
assault, aggravated battery, dangerous use of explosives, negligent use of 
a deadly weapon, murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary 
manslaughter, kidnapping, criminal sexual penetration, criminal sexual 
contact of a minor, homicide by vehicle, great bodily injury by vehicle or 
abandonment or abuse of a child or that victim’s representative.151   
However, a New Mexico statute on crime victims, which implements these 
rights, is broader by including as a victim “an individual against whom a criminal 
offense is committed” and some family members of crime victims.152  Furthermore, 
                                                          
plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding . . . [t]he reasonable right to confer with the 
attorney for the Government in the case . . . [t]he right to full and timely restitution as 
provided in law); id. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (“The court, when sentencing a defendant . . . may order, 
in addition to or, in the case of a misdemeanor, in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law, 
that the defendant make restitution to any victim of such offense . . . .”); id. § 3663A 
(“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when sentencing a defendant convicted . . . the 
court shall order, in addition to, or in the case of a misdemeanor, in addition to or in lieu of, 
any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the 
offense . . . .”). 
 
150
 See id. § 3663(c)(1) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . in which there is 
no identifiable victim, the court may order that the defendant make restitution . . . .”); id. § 
3663(c)(2)(A) (“An order of restitution under this subsection shall be based on the amount of 
public harm caused by the offense . . . .”); id. § 3663(c)(2)(B) (“In no case shall the amount of 
restitution ordered under this subsection exceed the amount of the fine which may be ordered 
for the offense charged in the case.”); id. § 3663(c)(3) (“Restitution under this subsection shall 
be distributed as follows: (A) 65 percent of the total amount of restitution shall be paid to the 
State entity designated to administer crime victim assistance in the State in which the crime 
occurred. (B) 35 percent of the total amount of restitution shall be paid to the State entity 
designated to receive Federal substance abuse block grant funds.”). 
 
151
 N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24(A).  It is expressly stated in the crime victim rights section of 
the New Mexico Constitution that the noted crime victim rights do not take effect until the 
legislature enacts statutes.  Id. art. II, § 24(C) (“The provisions of this amendment shall not 
take effect until the legislature enacts laws to implement this amendment.”). 
 
152
 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-26-3(F) (West 2010) (“As used in the Victims of Crime Act . . . 
‘victim’ means an individual against whom a criminal offense is committed.  ‘Victim’ also 
means a family member or a victim’s representative when the individual against whom a 
criminal offense was committed is a minor, is incompetent or is a homicide victim . . . 
‘criminal offense’ means . . . negligent arson resulting in death or bodily injury . . . aggravated 
arson . . . aggravated assault . . . aggravated battery . . . dangerous use of explosives . . . 
negligent use of a deadly weapon . . . murder . . . voluntary manslaughter . . . involuntary 
manslaughter . . . kidnapping . . . criminal sexual penetration . . . criminal sexual contact of a 
minor . . . armed robbery . . . homicide by vehicle . . . great bodily injury by vehicle . . . 
abandonment or abuse of a child . . . stalking or aggravated stalking . . . aggravated assault 
against a household member . . . assault against a household member with intent to commit a 
violent felony . . . battery against a household member . . . aggravated battery against a 
 
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss4/5
2010] MONETARY RECOVERIES FOR STATE CRIME VICTIM  839 
 
the New Mexico statute on crime victim recoveries at sentencing defines a victim as 
“any person who has suffered actual damages as a result of the defendant’s criminal 
activities.”153  
Another example of the conflicting terminology within one state is Texas, where 
a crime victim recovery at a sentencing is seemingly narrower (no property claims) 
than crime victim recovery from a state fund (property claims).154    
Who qualifies as a crime victim also differs among states.  Some state statutes 
allow varying kinds of family members of criminal code victims to themselves be 
victims in criminal case recovery settings, while others do not.155 
                                                          
household member”).  See also id. § 31-26-2 (“Recognizing the state’s concern for victims of 
crime, it is the purpose of the Victims of Crime Act to assure that: A. the full impact of a 
crime is brought to the attention of a court; B. victims of violent crimes are treated with 
dignity, respect and sensitivity at all stages of the criminal justice process; C. victims’ rights 
are protected by law enforcement agencies, prosecutors and judges as vigorously as are the 
rights of criminal defendants; and D. the provisions of Article 2, Section 24 of the 
Constitution of New Mexico are implemented in statute.”); id. § 31-26-6 (“The rights and 
duties established pursuant to the provisions of the Victims of Crime Act take effect when an 
individual is formally charged by a district attorney for allegedly committing a criminal 
offense against a victim.  Those rights and duties remain in effect until final disposition of the 
court proceedings attendant to the charged criminal offense.”). 
 
153
 Id. § 31-17-1(A)(1).  “Criminal activities” are also broader in statute than in the 
constitution.  See id. § 31-17-1(A)(3) (“‘[C]riminal activities’ includes any crime for which 
there is a plea of guilty or verdict of guilty, upon which a judgment may be rendered and any 
other crime committed after July 1, 1977 which is admitted or not contested by the 
defendant . . . .”). 
  Sometimes states with narrow constitutional definitions also have similarly narrow 
statutory definitions.  See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. I, § 22 (“‘victim of a crime’ means: a) a 
person who has suffered physical or psychological injury or has incurred loss of or damage to 
personal or real property as a result of a crime or an incident involving another person 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and b) the spouse, 
parent, legal guardian, grandparent, child or sibling of the decedent in the case of a criminal 
homicide.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-37 (West 2010) (“As used in this act, ‘victim’ means a 
person who suffers personal, physical or psychological injury or death or incurs loss of or 
injury to personal or real property as a result of a crime committed by an adult or an act of 
delinquency that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, committed against that 
person.  ‘Victim’ also includes the nearest relative of the victim of a criminal homicide.”). 
 
154
 Compare TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.01(3) (West 2010) (“‘Victim’ means a 
person who is the victim of the offense of sexual assault, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, 
trafficking of persons, or injury to a child, elderly individual, or disabled individual or who 
has suffered personal injury or death as a result of the criminal conduct of another.”), and  
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.037(a) (West 2010) (“In addition to any fine authorized 
by law, the court that sentences a defendant convicted of an offense may order the defendant 
to make restitution to any victim of the offense”), with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
42.037(b) (West 2010) (“If the offense results in damage to or loss or destruction of property 
of a victim of the offense, the court may order the defendant: (A) to return the property to the 
owner of the property or someone designated by the owner; or (B) if return of the property is 
impossible or impractical or is an inadequate remedy, to pay an amount equal to the greater of 
(i) the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss, or destruction; or (ii) the value of 
the property on the date of sentencing, less the value of any part of the property that is 
returned on the date the property is returned.”). 
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There are further interstate differences between crime victims within a single 
recovery setting.  Consider crime victim recoveries from state funds.  In Florida, 
“victim” in a state fund setting encompasses not just the person harmed most directly 
by an offender’s actions, but also a child who observed the crime and suffered 
resulting emotional or psychological stress.156  Elsewhere, crime victim recoveries 
from state funds are limited to specific victims.157  In Texas, a crime victim entitled 
to a state-funded recovery need not be harmed in Texas and need not be a resident of 
Texas.158  Even a Texas resident who suffers harm outside of the United States can 
                                                          
 
155
 Compare, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4401(19) (West 2010) (“‘Victim’ means a 
person against whom the criminal offense has been committed, including a minor, or if the 
person is killed or incapacitated, the person’s spouse, parent, child, grandparent or sibling ”), 
and id. § 13-4438 (“a judge of the superior court shall make the following statement: If you 
are the victim of a crime with a case pending before this court, you are advised that you have 
rights . . . to receive restitution from a person who is convicted of causing your loss”), with id. 
§ 13-804(A) (“Upon a defendant’s conviction for an offense causing economic loss to any 
person, the court, in its sole discretion, may order that all or any portion of the fine imposed be 
allocated as restitution to be paid by the defendant to any person who suffered an economic 
loss caused by the defendant's conduct.”). 
 
156
 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.03(14) (West 2010) (“Victim means: (a) A person who suffers 
personal physical injury or death as a direct result of a crime; (b) A person younger than 18 
years of age who was present at the scene of a crime, saw or heard the crime, and suffered a 
psychiatric or psychological injury because of the crime, but who was not physically injured; 
or (c) A person against whom a forcible felony was committed and who suffers a psychiatric 
or psychological injury as a direct result of that crime but who does not otherwise sustain a 
personal physical injury or death.”).  
 
157
 For example, in New Mexico the state funded scheme narrowly defines a victim under 
the same crime-specific categories found in the criminal code provisions and the constitution.  
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-3(I) (West 2010) (“As used in the Crime Victims Reparation 
Act . . . ‘victim’ means: (1) a person in New Mexico who is injured or killed by any act or 
omission of any other person that is a crime enumerated in [N.M. Stat. § 31-22-8]; (2) a 
resident of New Mexico who is injured or killed by such a crime occurring in a state other 
than New Mexico if that state does not have an eligible crime victims compensation program; 
or (3) a resident of New Mexico who is injured or killed by an act of international 
terrorism . . . .”); id. § 31-22-8 (“The crimes to which the Crime Victims Reparation Act 
applies and for which reparation to victims may be made are the following enumerated 
offenses and all other offenses in which any enumerated offense is necessarily included: (1) 
arson resulting in bodily injury; (2) aggravated arson; (3) aggravated assault or aggravated 
battery; (4) dangerous use of explosives; (5) negligent use of a deadly weapon; (6) murder; (7) 
voluntary manslaughter; (8) involuntary manslaughter; (9) kidnapping; (10) criminal sexual 
penetration; (11) criminal sexual contact of a minor; (12) homicide by vehicle or great bodily 
injury by vehicle . . . (13) abandonment or abuse of a child; (14) aggravated indecent exposure 
[and] (15) aggravated stalking”). 
 
158
 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.32(11) (West 2010) (“‘Victim’ means . . . (A) an 
individual who: (i) suffers personal injury or death as a result of criminally injurious conduct 
or as a result of actions taken by the individual as an intervener, if the conduct or actions 
occurred in this state; and (ii) is a resident of this state, another state of the United States, the 
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a possession or territory of the 
United States; (B) an individual who: (i) suffers personal injury or death as a result of 
criminally injurious conduct or as a result of actions taken by the individual as an intervener, 
if the conduct or actions occurred in a state or country that does not have a crime victims’ 
compensation program . . . (ii) is a resident of this state; and (iii) would be entitled to 
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be a victim for state funded recovery purposes,159 as can a person who acts on behalf 
of a victim or who pays for a victim’s losses.160 
With an understanding of the possible mix of constitutional and statutory 
provisions as well as the challenges posed by inconsistent terminology, we now 
explore more fully crime victim recoveries in civil claims, agency or special court 
proceedings involving state funds, and criminal cases. 
C.  Civil Claim Recoveries 
All American states provide opportunities for some crime victims to 
independently pursue recovery in civil cases from the criminally alleged, accused, or 
convicted.  In such cases, the judicial and/or prosecutorial cooperation, often 
necessary for recoveries during criminal case sentencing, is unnecessary.  Recoveries 
are available for crime victims independent of any criminal prosecution, case, or 
sentence.161  However, state funds are not available to them in such civil cases.  
A victim’s claim against a criminal typically arises under common law tort.162  
State legislatures occasionally impose duties on specially created offices, 
prosecutors, or peace officers to assist victims with such civil cases.163  Civil claim 
                                                          
compensation under this subchapter if the criminally injurious conduct or actions had occurred 
in this state . . . .”). 
 
159
 Id. (“‘Victim’ means . . . (C) an individual who: (i) suffers personal injury or death as a 
result of criminally injurious conduct caused by an act of international terrorism . . . 
committed outside of the United States; and (ii) is a resident of this state.”).  See also KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.025 (West 2010) (“‘Victim’ shall also include nonresidents of this 
state who suffer losses as a direct result of criminal acts occurring within this state.”). 
 
160
 TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 56.32(2) (“‘Claimant’ means, except as provided by 
Subsection (b), any of the following individuals who is entitled to file or has filed a claim for 
compensation under this subchapter: (A) an authorized individual acting on behalf of a victim; 
(B) an individual who legally assumes the obligation or who voluntarily pays medical or 
burial expenses of a victim incurred as a result of the criminally injurious conduct of another; 
(C) a dependent of a victim who died as a result of criminally injurious conduct; (D) an 
immediate family member or household member of a victim who: (i) requires psychiatric care 
or counseling as a result of the criminally injurious conduct; or (ii) as a result of the criminally 
injurious conduct, incurs with respect to a deceased victim expenses for traveling to and 
attending the victim’s funeral or suffers wage loss from bereavement leave taken in 
connection with the death of that victim; or (E) an authorized individual acting on behalf of an 
individual who is described by Subdivision (C) or (D) and who is a child.”). 
 
161
 See, e.g., CARRINGTON & RAPP, supra note 129, § 5.01[1][a] (based on 21A AM. JUR. 2D 
Criminal Law § 1028 (1981), the “[c]ommitment of the perpetrator to prison affords no 
immunity against suit, service of civil process, or enforcement of a judgment”). 
 
162
 See, e.g., id. (“Theories of recovery are usually obvious and well recognized, including 
assault, battery, false imprisonment and infliction of emotional distress.”). 
 
163
 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-302.5(1)(i) (West 2010) (“[E]ach victim of a 
crime shall have the following rights . . . [t]he right to be informed of the victim’s right to 
pursue a civil judgment against any person convicted of a crime against the victim . . . as a 
result of the commission of the crime regardless of whether the court has ordered such person 
to make restitution to the victim . . . .”); id. § 24-4.1-303(1) (“Law enforcement agencies, 
prosecutorial agencies, judicial agencies and correctional agencies shall ensure that victims of 
crimes are afforded the rights described in section 24-4.1-302.5.”). 
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recovery may sometimes be labeled as restitution.164  Crime victim recovery rights in 
civil cases should have no significant effects on the criminal case procedures.     
Civil case recoveries by crime victims are at times referenced in statutes chiefly 
dealing with crime victim participation in criminal cases.  Other statutes simply 
recognize that civil case recovery is available.  Thus, some crime victim rights 
provisions include the “right” to “restitution,” which could include civil as well as 
criminal case recoveries.165  The criminal procedure laws in some states recognize a 
right to seek166 or to pursue167 restitution, or a right to restitution “to the extent 
possible.”168 
D.  Administrative and Special Court Recoveries 
Crime victim recoveries can also involve state funds.  Such recoveries may be 
based on constitutional directives.  A few state constitutions expressly recognize the 
opportunity for state-supported recoveries.169  Other state constitutions authorize the 
legislature to enact laws to assist crime victims.170  In Oklahoma, while there is no 
                                                          
 
164
 For example, constitutional crime victim restitution at times seems untied to crime 
victim recovery at criminal case sentencing.  See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30 (“A crime victim has 
the following rights . . . the right to restitution . . . .”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (“This state 
shall ensure that crime victims have all of the following privileges and protections as provided 
by law . . . restitution; compensation . . . .”). 
 
165
 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.13(1)(c) (West 2010) (“[t]he right to restitution for 
pecuniary losses”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 120/4(a)(10) (West 2010) (“right to 
restitution”). 
 
166
 Louisiana statutorily and constitutionally provides a right only to seek restitution.  LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844(M) (West 2010); LA. CONST. art. I, § 25.  Yet the same statute 
says that “[i]f the defendant is found guilty, the court or parole board shall require the 
defendant to pay restitution . . . .”  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844(M)(1). 
 
167
 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-40-5-7 (West 2010). 
 
168
 See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11.201(6) (recognizes a right of a crime victim to 
“be restored, to the extent possible, to the precrime economic status through the provision of 
restitution, compensation and the expeditious return of property”). 
 
169
 But see TEX. CONST. art. I, § 31(a)-(b) (“The compensation to victims of crime fund 
created by general law and the compensation to victims of crime auxiliary fund created by 
general law are each a separate dedicated account in the general revenue fund. . . . [M]oney 
deposited to the credit of the compensation to victims of crime fund or the compensation to 
victims of crime auxiliary fund from any source may be expended as provided by law only for 
delivering or funding victim-related compensation, services, or assistance.”); WIS. CONST. art. 
I, § 9m (“This state shall ensure that crime victims have all of the following privileges and 
protections as provided by law . . . restitution; compensation . . . .”); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23 
(“A victim of crime . . . shall be entitled to receive, from the perpetrator of the crime, financial 
compensation for any injury or loss caused by the perpetrator of the crime, and shall receive 
such other compensation as the state may provide.”); GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 6(f) (“The 
General Assembly shall be authorized to allocate certain funds, to appropriate funds, to 
provide for a continuing fund, or to provide for any combination thereof for the purpose of 
compensating innocent victims of crime and for the administration of any laws enacted for 
such purpose.”). 
 
170
 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(D) (“The legislature, or the people by initiative or 
referendum, have the authority to enact substantive and procedural laws to define, implement, 
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explicit state constitutional provision for crime victim recovery, a state statute 
provides that it is the “intent of the Legislature to provide a method of compensating 
and assisting those persons who become victims of criminal acts.”171  In Georgia, the 
constitution authorizes the General Assembly to compensate “innocent victims of 
crime.”172  In some state schemes, one can seek recovery from state funds though not 
an actual victim of a crime as defined in the criminal code.  Such claimants 
sometimes include family members of crime victims.173  
State-funded compensation is sometimes paid with funds derived from criminal 
case cost assessments.174  At other times, there are different assessments.175  Federal 
                                                          
preserve and protect the rights guaranteed to victims . . . .”).  Such rights, by the text of the 
constitution, include the right  
To be present at and, upon request, to be informed of all criminal proceedings 
where the defendant has the right to be present [and] [t]o confer with the 
prosecution, after the crime against the victim has been charged, before trial or 
before any disposition of the case and to be informed of the disposition. 
Id. art. II, § 2.1(A).  See also MO. CONST. art. I, § 32(5) (“The general assembly shall have 
power to enforce this section by appropriate legislation.”).  Rights provided in the Missouri 
Constitution include “[t]he right to be present at all criminal justice proceedings at which the 
defendant has such right . . . [t]he right to information about how the criminal justice system 
works, the rights and the availability of services, and upon request of the victim the right to 
information about the crime.”  Id. art. I, § 32(1). 
 
171
 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142.1 (West 2010). 
 
172
 GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 6(f). 
 
173
 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 624(1) (McKinney 2010) (surviving family members and 
dependents of those murdered as crime victims); ALA. CODE § 15-23-3 (West 2010) (“(3) 
VICTIM.  A person who suffered serious personal injury or death as a result of criminally 
injurious conduct. . . .  (4) DEPENDENT.  A natural person wholly or partially dependent 
upon the victim for care or support, and includes a child of the victim born after the death of 
the victim where the death occurred as a result of criminally injurious conduct. . . . (5) 
CLAIMANT.  Any of the following persons applying for compensation under this article: . . . 
A victim . . . .  A dependent . . . .  A person authorized to act on behalf of a victim or a 
dependent of a deceased victim if such victim died as a result of criminally injurious 
conduct.”). 
 
174
 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 938.03 (West 2010) (costs imposed in guilty plea, nolo 
contendere plea, and conviction settings). 
 
175
 In Alaska statutory fines imposed upon convicted offenders are not expressly directed to 
state-funded recovery schemes.  ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.035(b) (West 2010) (“Upon 
conviction of an offense, a defendant . . . may be sentenced to pay . . . $500,000 for murder in 
the first or second degree, attempted murder in the first degree, murder of an unborn child, 
sexual assault in the first degree, sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree, kidnapping, 
promoting prostitution in the first degree . . . $250,000 for a class A felony . . . $100,000 for a 
class B felony . . . $50,000 for a class C felony . . . $10,000 for a class A misdemeanor . . . 
$2,000 for a class B misdemeanor . . . $500 for a violation.”).  In other states, fines are 
directed toward state funds.  See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1025 (West 2010) (“In addition 
to any other fine which may be imposed upon each person found guilty of criminal activity, 
the court shall impose a fine or reimbursement . . . : For each conviction or finding of guilt of 
each felony count, a fine or reimbursement of not less than seventy-five dollars ($75.00) per 
felony count . . . ; For each conviction or finding of guilt of each misdemeanor count, a fine or 
reimbursement of thirty-seven dollars ($37.00) per misdemeanor count . . . .  In addition to 
 
25Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
844 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:819 
 
monies are available to states to support their crime victim recovery programs.176  
Many states mandate that losses already compensated through a collateral source, 
like a criminal case recovery, are not recoverable from a state fund.  In Oklahoma 
the relevant Board may require the victim to “seek or accept” any possible financial 
benefits from other sources.177  Georgia requires that a victim seek recovery from the 
offender in order to be eligible to receive compensation.178  While Alabama does not 
expressly require a “claimant to seek or accept any collateral source contribution,”179 
an award may be reduced or eliminated due to actual collateral source 
contributions.180  Where a victim has already recovered from a state fund, a court can 
sometimes direct payments from the criminal to the state for reimbursement.181 
                                                          
any fine or reimbursement ordered under subsection (a) or (b) above, the court shall impose a 
fine or reimbursement of not less than three hundred dollars ($300) per count for any 
conviction or finding of guilt for any sex offense . . . .  The fines or reimbursements imposed 
under the provisions of this section shall be paid into the crime victims compensation 
account.”).  
 
176
 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 10601 (West 2010) (“There is created in the Treasury a separate 
account to be known as the Crime Victims Fund . . . .  The Fund shall be available as follows: 
. . . The first $10,000,000 deposited in the Fund shall be available for grants under section 
10603a [involving grants to states for child abuse assistance programs] of this title. . . .  Of the 
remaining amount to be distributed from the Fund in a particular fiscal year . . . 47.5 percent 
shall be available for grants under section 10602 [grants to state supported crime victim 
compensation and assistance programs] of this title . . . .”). 
 
177
 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142.7 (West 2010).  Compare ALASKA. STAT. ANN. § 
18.67.090 (West 2010) (“If compensation is awarded under this chapter and the person 
receiving it also receives a collateral sum . . . that has not been deducted from it, the board 
may require that the person refund either the amount of the collateral sum or the amount of 
compensation paid to the person . . . whichever is less.”).  In Alaska, civil litigation may 
change the time in which a victim receives a compensation award.  In response to a 
questionnaire, the Administrator of Alaska’s Violent Crimes Compensation Board stated that 
the Board typically defers awards until the outcome of civil litigation.  Questionnaire from 
Professor Jeffrey A. Parness for Kate Hudson, Adm’r, Violent Crimes Comp. Bd. (July 13, 
2009). 
 
178
 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-8(a)(4) (West 2010) (“unless the board or director determines 
that such action would not be feasible”). 
 
179
 ALA. CODE § 15-23-9 (West 2010). 
 
180
 Id. § 15-23-12(b).  See also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 45/10.1(e) (West 2010). 
 
181
 See ALA. CODE § 15-23-14(d) (“Whenever compensation is awarded to a claimant who 
is entitled to restitution from a criminal defendant, the commission may initiate restitution 
hearings in such criminal proceedings or intervene in the same.  The commission shall be 
entitled to receive restitution in such proceedings to the extent that compensation was 
awarded.”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-110(3) (West 2010) (“If a defendant is ordered 
to pay restitution . . . to a person who has received compensation awarded under this part 1, an 
amount equal to the compensation awarded shall be transmitted from such restitution to the 
board for allocation to the fund.”); IDAHO CODE ANN.  § 72-1023 (West 2010) (“If a claimant 
seeks compensation . . . and compensation is awarded, the account is entitled to full 
subrogation against a judgment or recovery received by the claimant against the offender or 
from or against any other source for all compensation paid . . . .”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.92 
(West 2010) (“If a person receiving compensation under the program seeks indemnification 
which would reduce the compensation . . . the department is subrogated to the recovery to the 
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State-funded (as well as civil case) recoveries may differ from recoveries at 
criminal case sentencing because only for the latter might there be a requirement of a 
guilty plea or a conviction.182  Upon a plea for one offense, however, a criminal 
defendant may be able to agree to compensate a victim for losses stemming from 
another offense for which there is no plea or conviction,183 or perhaps even no formal 
charge. 
State-funded schemes for crime victim recovery often have caps.  In Alaska, 
awards cannot exceed $40,000 unless the claimant has more than one dependent, 
which prompts a cap of $80,000.184  California limits the recovery to $35,000, unless 
                                                          
extent of payments by the department to or on behalf of the person. . . . However, legal action 
by the department does not affect the right of a person to seek further relief in other legal 
actions.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.170 (West 2010) (“No right of action at law against a 
person who has committed a criminal act for damages as a consequence of such act shall be 
lost as a consequence of receiving benefits . . . .  If compensation is awarded, the state is 
subrogated to all the claimant’s rights to receive or recover benefits or advantages, for 
economic loss for which and to the extent only that compensation is awarded from a source 
which is, or, if readily available to the victim or claimant would be, a collateral source.”); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.61 (West 2010) (“The state shall be subrogated, to the extent of 
reparations awarded, to all the claimant’s rights to recover benefits or advantages for 
economic loss from a source which is or, if readily available to the victim or claimant would 
be, a collateral source.  Nothing in this section shall limit the claimant’s right to bring a cause 
of action to recover for other damages.”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2A-22 (West 2010) (“If an 
award of compensation is made . . . and is not reduced on account of the availability of 
payment by a collateral source, the state, upon the payment of the award or a part of the 
award, shall be subrogated to all of the claimant’s rights to receive or recover benefits or 
advantages for economic loss for which an award of compensation was made . . . .”).  See also 
Oregon v. Romero-Navarro, 197 P.3d 30, 32-33 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that because the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Account paid the victim’s parents for burial expenses at 
sentencing, the trial court could order the defendant to pay restitution to the fund as the 
Account was a “victim” under the statute on restitution, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.103(4)(c) 
(West 2010), because it had “expended moneys on behalf of a victim”).   
 
182
 See ALA. CODE § 15-23-13 (“[A]n award may be made whether or not any person is 
prosecuted or convicted.  Proof of conviction of a person whose acts give rise to a claim is 
conclusive evidence that the crime was committed . . . .”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1018(2) 
(West 2010) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-25-19(f) (West 2010) (“An award may be 
made under this section whether or not any person is prosecuted or convicted of any offense 
arising out of the act, or if the act is the subject of any other legal action.”).  But see ARIZ. 
CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(8) (“a victim of crime has a right . . . [t]o receive prompt restitution 
from the person or persons convicted of the criminal conduct that caused the victim’s loss or 
injury”).   
 
183
 See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-5-6(d) (West 2010) (“In instances where a 
defendant has more than one criminal charge pending against him in a single case, or more 
than one case, and the defendant stands convicted of one or more charges, a plea agreement 
negotiated by the State’s Attorney and the defendants may require the defendant to make 
restitution to victims of charges that have been dismissed or which it is contemplated will be 
dismissed under the terms of the plea agreement, and under the agreement, the court may 
impose a sentence of restitution on the charge or charges of which the defendant has been 
convicted that would require the defendant to make restitution to victims of other offenses as 
provided in the plea agreement.”). 
 
184
 ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.130(c) (West 2010). 
27Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
846 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:819 
 
federal funds are available.185  In Alabama and Indiana there is a $15,000 cap.186  At 
least one state differentiates the caps based on the types of expenses.187  
While many state-funded schemes require crime victims to file applications with 
an administrative agency,188 with the applications determined by the agency,189 in 
Illinois a victim files with the Court of Claims.190  An Illinois victim must release 
relevant reports, documents, and other information to the Attorney General’s 
Office.191  Failure to comply with the Attorney General’s requests for information 
will result in dismissal.192  The Illinois Court of Claims then considers the 
application as well as a report by the Attorney General.193  Although the application 
                                                          
 
185
 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 13957(b) (West 2010).  If federal funds are available, the cap is 
$70,000.  Id. 
 
186
 ALA. CODE § 15-23-15(b); IND. CODE § 5-2-6.1-35(a)(1) (West 2010).  See also 740 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 45/10.1(f) (West 2010) ($27,000 cap). 
 
187
 IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.86(1)-(2), (6) (West 2010) (“Reasonable charges incurred for 
medical care not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars.  Reasonable charges incurred for 
mental health care not to exceed five thousand dollars . . . .  Loss of income from work the 
victim would have performed and for which the victim would have received remuneration if 
the victim had not been injured, not to exceed six thousand dollars. . . . Reasonable funeral 
and burial expenses not to exceed seven thousand five hundred dollars.”). 
 
188
 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.07 (West 2010) (“A claim for compensation may be filed by 
a person eligible for compensation . . . .  Claims may be filed in the Tallahassee office of the 
department in person or by mail.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1012 (“An applicant . . . may 
apply in writing in a form that conforms substantially to that prescribed by the commission.”); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-25-19 (“[T]he victim . . . may apply to the office for 
compensation.”). 
 
189
 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.09 (“The department shall have authority to allow, deny, 
controvert, and litigate claims . . . and to delegate to the Crime Victims’ Services Office such 
authority.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1012 (“An applicant for an award of compensation may 
apply in writing in a form that conforms substantially to that prescribed by the commission.”); 
id. § 72-1018(1) (“The commission shall award compensation benefits . . . if satisfied by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the requirements for compensation have been met.”); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-25-18 (“The office [of the general treasurer] . . . shall designate a 
program administrator. . . .  The administrator shall investigate each application for 
compensation, verify the information contained on the application and in all supporting 
documentation and award or deny compensation . . . .”). 
 
190
 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/6.1 (“A person is entitled to compensation under this Act 
if . . . [w]ithin 2 years of the occurrence of the crime, or within one year after a criminal 
indictment of a person for an offense, upon which the claim is based, he files an application, 
under oath, with the Court of Claims . . . .”). 
 
191
 Id. at 45/7.1 
 
192
 Id. at 45/8.1 (“If an applicant does not submit all materials substantiating his claim as 
requested . . . by the Attorney General, the Attorney General shall notify the applicant in 
writing . . . that he has 30 days in which to furnish those items . . . .  The Attorney General 
shall report an applicant’s failure to comply within 30 days of the foregoing notice to the 
Court of Claims. . . . No award of compensation shall be made for any portion of the 
applicant’s claim that is not substantiated by the applicant.”). 
 
193
 Id. at 45/9.1.  
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must be filed with the Court of Claims, an attorney may not collect a fee for assisting 
a victim-applicant with the application.194  “Reasonable” attorney’s fees may, 
however, be recovered if counsel represents the victim at a hearing.195   
Outside of Illinois, victims usually apply to a special board.196  Like the Illinois 
Attorney General, state boards typically cannot represent victims.197  Claimants must 
file claims in a timely manner.  A victim in Kentucky has five years after the 
commission of a crime.198  A victim in Indiana only has 180 days.199   
When waiting for an application to be processed, victims in some states can 
request an emergency award.  Such a recovery can be based on the probability that 
the application will be granted and that the victim will suffer undue hardship if an 
immediate award is not made.200  In Connecticut, an emergency award may go as 
high as $2,000.201  In Indiana, an emergency award is capped at $500.202  Rhode 
Island leaves the amount of any emergency award to the discretion of the board or 
program director, but limits emergency burial expenses to $5,000.203  Generally, 
there is no award if there are no funds.204  Many states also impose requirements on 
                                                          
 
194
 Id. at 45/12 (“If the applicant is represented by counsel . . . in making [the] application 
under this Act or in any further proceedings provided for in this Act, that counsel or agent 
may receive no payment for his services in preparing or presenting the application before the 
Court of Claims.”). 
 
195
 Id.  
 
196
 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 15-23-4, -8 (West 2010). 
 
197
 See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/4.1 (“[T]he Attorney General shall . . . represent the 
interests of the State . . . .”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 18.353(1) (West 2010) (“The 
commission shall do all of the following: . . . Investigate and determine claims for awards and 
reinvestigate or reopen cases as the commission considers necessary. . . . Direct medical 
examination of victims. . . . Review all appeals, hold hearings, administer oaths or 
affirmations, examine any person under oath or affirmation, issue subpoenas requiring the 
attendance and giving of testimony of witnesses and the production of books, papers, 
documentary or other evidence. . . . Take or cause to be taken affidavits or depositions within 
or without the state.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1130(1), (3) (2010) (“A claim, once accepted 
for filing and completed, must be assigned to a field representative.  The field representative 
shall examine the papers filed in support of the claim and cause an investigation to be 
conducted into the validity of the claim.  The investigation shall include but not be limited to 
an examination of police, court, and official records and reports concerning the crime and an 
examination of medical and hospital reports relating to the injury upon which the claim is 
based. . . . The field representative conducting the investigation shall file with the deputy 
director a written report setting forth a recommendation and his reason for the 
recommendation.  The deputy director shall render a written decision and furnish the claimant 
with a copy of the decision.”). 
 198 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.060(2) (West 2010). 
 
199
 IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.1-16(b) (West 2010). 
 
200
 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.67.120 (West 2010). 
 
201
 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-217 (West 2010). 
 
202
 IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.1-36(a). 
 
203
 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-25-21.1(b)-(c) (West 2010). 
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crime victims, including clean hands205 and cooperation throughout any criminal 
process.206  At times, recovery is only available for harm due to violence.207 
Besides providing for recoveries, some state-funded schemes provide services to 
crime victims as well.  In Virginia, the scheme funds a crime victims ombudsman.208  
The Rhode Island scheme assists crime victims by informing them of their rights.209  
In Georgia, ten percent of the fund is designated for victim service providers and for 
dissemination of materials about crime victim recovery.210 
There are some interstate differences in funding.  Usually there is an assessment 
against an offender that is placed into a fund.211  The amounts collected vary.  Some 
states, like Colorado, have a flat assessment regardless of the offense, with no 
                                                          
 
204
 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-9 (West 2010) (“[U]nless and until sufficient funds 
become available,” awards are “paid in chronological order.”). 
 
205
 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-23-12(a)(2) (West 2010). 
 
206
 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-108(1)(c) (West 2010).  
 
207
 See IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.1-7 (defining “victim” as “an individual who suffers bodily 
injury or death as a result of a violent crime”); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-7(g) (“No award . . . 
for loss of property.”).  But see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-109(1.5)(a)(I)(A), (B) 
(allowing recoveries for damage to residential property including reimbursement of insurance 
deductible). 
 
208
 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.3:1 (West 2010). 
 
209
 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-25-29. 
 
210
 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-14.  See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.83 (West 2010) (“The 
department shall . . . [p]ublicize through the department, county sheriff departments, 
municipal police departments, county attorney offices, and other public or private agencies, 
the existence of the crime victim compensation program, including the procedures for 
obtaining compensation under the program.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.56 (West 2010) 
(“[T]he board shall . . . publicize widely the availability of reparations and the method of 
making claims . . . .”).  Also note that referrals for victim compensation can come from other 
sources.  Minnesota notes in its 2008 annual report that while 49% of victim referrals come 
from a victim service provider, 39 of 1819 claims were referred by a funeral home, while 49 
referrals came from “unknown” sources.  MINN. CRIME VICTIMS REPARATIONS BD., MINN. 
DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 7 (2008).   
 
211
 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 938.03 (West 2010) (“Any person pleading guilty or nolo 
contendere to, or being convicted of . . . any felony, misdemeanor . . . or criminal traffic 
offense . . . shall pay as an additional cost . . . the sum of $50. . . . These costs shall not be 
waived . . . . The clerk of the court shall . . . forward $49 of each $50 . . . to be deposited in the 
Crimes Compensation Trust Fund.”).  In fiscal year (“FY”) 2008, “court fines and restitution 
amounts contributed over $2.7 million, or 79%, of program funding” in Delaware.  VIOLENT 
CRIMES COMP. BD., STATE OF DEL., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2008).  In West Virginia, for FY 
2008, state funds collected through fines and costs to defendants totaled $1,633,260.  CRIME 
VICTIMS COMP. BD., W.V. COURT OF CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 3 (2008).  In 
Minnesota, 24% of the compensation fund for FY 2008 came from “restitution payments . . . 
unclaimed restitution, funds from civil awards paid to victims, and inmate wage deductions 
transferred from the Minnesota Department of Corrections.”  MINN. CRIME VICTIMS 
REPARATIONS BD., MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 9 
(2008).  In Idaho, fines, restitution, and subrogation accounted for $2,321,600 in FY 2008.  
IDAHO INDUS. COMM’N, STATE OF IDAHO, ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 5 (2008). 
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judicial discretion.212  Others have a range depending upon the level of the crime, 
with some judicial discretion.  Oklahoma assesses offenders from $50 to $10,000 for 
each injurious felony,213 $45 to $1,000 for each other felony, and $30 to $300 for 
each misdemeanor.214  In Alabama, the assessment is $50 to $10,000 for each felony 
and $25 to $1,000 for each misdemeanor.215  In determining discretionary 
assessments, courts often consider “the severity of the crime, the prior criminal 
record, and the ability of the defendant to pay, as well as the economic impact of the 
victim compensation assessment on the dependents of the defendant.”216 
State-funded recoveries are also available for victims in federal criminal cases.  
The federal Crime Victims Fund217 assists states in funding their crime victim 
recovery schemes.  Unlike state funds that provide monies directly to crime victims, 
the federal fund simply awards grants to states.218  Since 2002, the Crime Victims 
Fund makes annual grants constituting about sixty percent of the monies available to 
state funds.219  To receive grants, state funds must qualify.  Eligible funds must be 
operated by the state, offer compensatory awards to victims,220 and promote victim 
cooperation with law enforcement.221  Grant recipients must also certify that the state 
will not cut funds already available,222 that the fund does not discriminate between 
citizens and non-citizens223 or between victims of state offenses and federal 
offenses,224 that the fund will not deny claimants based on their family or residential 
relationship with the alleged offender,225 and that the fund will not support a claimant 
                                                          
 
212
 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-4.1-119(1)(a) ($163 for felonies and $78 for 
misdemeanors). 
 
213
 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142.18(A) (West 2010). 
 
214
 Id. § 142.18(B). 
 
215
 ALA. CODE § 15-23-17(b) (West 2010). 
 
216
 ALA. CODE § 15-23-17(b).  See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 142.18(A) (“In addition 
to the imposition of any costs, penalties or fines imposed pursuant to law, any person 
convicted of, pleading guilty to or agreeing to a deferred judgment procedure . . . shall be 
ordered to pay a victim compensation assessment of at least Fifty Dollars ($50.00), but not to 
exceed Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000) . . . .  In imposing this penalty, the court shall 
consider factors such as the severity of the crime, the prior criminal record, the expenses of 
the victim of the crime, and the ability of the defendant to pay, as well as the economic impact 
of the victim compensation assessment on the dependents of the defendant.”). 
 
217
 42 U.S.C.A. § 10601 (West 2010). 
 
218
 Id. § 10602(a)(1) (“[T]he Director shall make an annual grant from the Fund to an 
eligible crime victim compensation program . . . .”). 
 
219
 Id.  
 
220
 Id. § 10602(b)(1). 
 
221
 Id. § 10602(b)(2). 
 
222
 Id. § 10602(b)(3) (“such State certifies that grants received under this section will not be 
used to supplant State funds otherwise available to provide victim compensation”). 
 
223
 Id. § 10602(b)(4). 
 
224
 Id. § 10602(b)(5).  
 
225
 Id. § 10602(b)(7). 
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who has “been convicted of an offense under Federal law with respect to any time 
period during which the person is delinquent in paying a fine, other monetary 
penalty, or restitution imposed for the offense.”226  The federal Crime Victims Fund 
also assists with crime victim legal aid227 and with child abuse prevention and 
treatment.228  Furthermore, it supports victims of domestic229 and international 
terrorism.230 
E.  Criminal Case Recoveries 
Beside civil claim and state-funded recoveries, crime victims can recover during 
criminal case sentencing.  Restitution is the term often used, though the same term is 
also used for recoveries in civil cases or from state funds.  State approaches to 
criminal case recoveries differ, including variations on what is recoverable, 
collection procedures, and enforcement. 
Recoveries at sentencing typically require a conviction, upon either trial or 
plea.231  However, some states allow recoveries when a criminal defendant pleads 
                                                          
 
226
 Id. § 10602(b)(8). 
 
227
 Id. § 10603d (“The Director may make grants . . . to develop, establish, and maintain 
programs for the enforcement of crime victims’ rights as provided by law. . . . Grant amounts 
under this section may not be used to bring a cause of action for damages.”). 
 
228
 Id. § 10603a. 
 
229
 Id. § 10603b(b) (“The Director may make supplemental grants . . . to States, victim 
service organizations, and public agencies (including Federal, State, or local governments) 
and nongovernmental organizations that provide assistance to victims of crime, which shall be 
used to provide emergency relief, including crisis response efforts, assistance, compensation, 
training, and technical assistance, and ongoing assistance, including during any investigation 
or prosecution, to victims of terrorists acts or mass violence occurring within the United 
States.”). 
 
230
 Id. § 10603b(a)(1) (“The Director may make supplemental grants . . . to States . . . 
victim service organizations, public agencies (including Federal, State, or local governments) 
and nongovernmental organizations that provide assistance to victims of crime, which shall be 
used to provide emergency relief, including crisis response efforts, assistance, training, and 
technical assistance, and ongoing assistance, including during any investigation or 
prosecution, to victims of terrorist acts or mass violence occurring outside the United 
States.”); id. § 10603c(b) (“The Director may use the emergency reserve . . . to carry out a 
program to compensate victims of acts of international terrorism that occur outside the United 
States for expenses associated with that victimization.”). 
 
231
 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-65 (West 2010) (“[I]t is essential . . . that all perpetrators 
of criminal activity . . . be required to fully compensate all victims of such conduct . . . .”). 
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nolo contendere.232  Notably, at least several states allow recoveries at sentencing for 
uncharged offenses and for charges dismissed pursuant to plea agreements.233    
States sometimes mandate that recovery be ordered at sentencing.  Iowa, for 
example, mandates that “[i]n all criminal cases in which there is a plea of guilty, 
verdict of guilty, or special verdict upon which a judgment of conviction is rendered, 
the sentencing court shall order that restitution be made.”234  Other states recognize 
some judicial discretion, as in Florida where judges can find “clear and compelling 
reasons not to order such restitution.”235  Florida does require a judge to state the 
reasons for not ordering restitution.236  In Maryland, a “victim is presumed to have a 
right to restitution.”237 
In assessing recoveries at sentencing, many states require victims to prove their 
damages.238  In South Carolina, the court “must hold a hearing to determine the 
                                                          
 
232
 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-201(5) (West 2010) (“[I]f a person has been found 
guilty of an offense upon a verdict of guilty or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and the 
sentencing judge finds that a victim . . . has sustained a pecuniary loss, the sentencing judge 
shall, as part of the sentence, require payment of full restitution to the victim . . . .”); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 31-17-1 (West 2010) (“‘[C]riminal activities’ includes any crime for which 
there is a plea of guilty or verdict of guilty . . . and any other crime committed after July 1, 
1977 which is admitted or not contested by the defendant . . . .”). 
 
233
 See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2280 (LexisNexis 2010) (“With the consent of the 
parties, the court may order restitution for the . . . loss sustained by the victim of an uncharged 
offense or an offense dismissed pursuant to plea negotiations.”); State v. Green, 28 So. 3d 
1105, 1109 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (applying comparable law, LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 883.2 
(2010)).  But see State v. Colon, 925 N.E.2d 212, 214-15 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (finding that 
an aggravated arson conviction upon trial cannot support restitution for stolen property 
admitted to by criminal defendant in the arson case). 
 
234
 IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.2 (West 2010).  See also ALA. CODE § 15-18-67 (“When a 
defendant is convicted of a criminal activity or conduct which has resulted in pecuniary 
damages or loss to a victim, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the amount or type of 
restitution due to the victim or victims of such defendant’s criminal acts.  Such restitution 
hearings shall be held as a matter of course and in addition to any other sentence which it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution or otherwise compensate such 
victim for any pecuniary damages.”); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-5-6 (West 2010) 
(mandating restitution for all convictions under the 1961 Criminal Code where there is 
personal injury or property damage). 
 
235
 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(1)(a) (West 2010). 
 
236
 Id. § 775.089(1)(b) (requiring the court to state reasons also when it “orders restitution 
of only a portion of the damages”). 
 
237
 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-603(b) (West 2010) (if restitution is requested and 
evidence of actual expenses or injury is presented). 
 
238
 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.200 (West 2010) (“The court in which the 
conviction is had, if applied to by verified petition made within ninety (90) days of the date 
the sentence was pronounced, may order restitution or give judgment . . . for reparation in 
damages . . . .  In a petition for restitution or reparation, the court shall cause the defendant, if 
in custody, to be brought into court, and demand of him if he has any defense to make to the 
petition.  If he consents to the restitution or to reparation in damages in an agreed sum, the 
court shall give judgment accordingly.  Otherwise a jury shall be impaneled to try the facts 
and ascertain the amount and the value of the property, or assess the damage, as the case may 
be.”). 
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amount of restitution due the victim” as a result of the defendant’s criminal acts.239  
This hearing must be held unless the defendant agrees to an amount on the record.240  
In Alabama, the court “shall hold a hearing” to determine the recoveries,241 with the 
court entering findings of facts after a hearing where the defendant, victim, district 
attorney, and other interested parties may be heard.242 
Some responsibility for securing recoveries at sentencing is assigned to 
prosecutors and other law enforcement officials.  A Utah statute provides that “[a]ny 
law enforcement agency conducting an investigation for criminal conduct which 
would constitute a felony or class A misdemeanor shall provide in their investigative 
reports whether a claim for restitution exists, the basis for the claim, and the 
estimated or actual amount of the claim.”243  In Oklahoma, the district attorney, 
during a plea bargain “in every case where the victim has suffered economic loss, 
shall, as a part of the plea bargain, require that the offender pay restitution to the 
crime victim.”244  In Pennsylvania, “[i]t shall be the responsibility of the district 
attorneys . . . to make a recommendation . . . as to the amount of restitution.”245  In 
Wyoming, while the “prosecuting attorney shall present to the court any claim for 
restitution submitted by any victim,”246 there is no duty to investigate or to 
independently seek recovery for the victim.247  In Oregon, prosecutors must 
investigate and present evidence of crime victim losses.248 
Some states require judges to consider a defendant’s ability to pay when 
determining recovery, while others expressly prohibit this.  In Alabama, “the court 
may take into consideration . . . [t]he financial resources of the defendant . . . [and] 
                                                          
 
239
 S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-322(A) (West 2010). 
 
240
 Id.  
 
241
 ALA. CODE § 15-18-67. 
 
242
 Id. § 15-18-69 (allowing these parties to be heard on the issue of restitution). 
 
243
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-201 (West 2010). 
 
244
 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 991f(E)(4) (West 2010).  Furthermore, the district attorney 
“shall be authorized to act as a clearing house for collection and disbursement of restitution 
payments.”  Id. 
 
245
 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1106(c)(4)(i) (West 2010).  The district attorney has the 
obligation to elicit information from the victim, and in the event that the victim has not 
responded to the district attorney’s request for restitution information, the district attorney 
“shall, based on other available information, make a recommendation to the court for 
restitution.”  Id. § 1106(c)(4)(ii).  
 
246
 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-103 (West 2010). 
 
247
 Id. § 7-9-111 (“[T]he prosecuting attorney has no obligation to investigate alleged 
pecuniary damages or to petition the court for restitution on behalf of a victim.  In the event 
that the victim is not satisfied with the restitution plan approved or modified by the court, the 
victim’s sole and exclusive remedy is a civil action.”). 
 
248
 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.106(1) (West 2010) (“When a person is convicted of a 
crime . . . that has resulted in economic damages, the district attorney shall investigate and 
present to the court, prior to the time of sentencing, evidence of the nature and amount of the 
damages.”). 
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[t]he ability of the defendant to pay restitution.”249  In contrast, a court in Alaska 
“may not, in ordering the amount of restitution, consider the defendant’s ability to 
pay restitution.”250  Similarly, in Florida judges can only consider the victim’s loss in 
determining the amount of restitution.251  In Arizona, a court “shall not consider the 
economic circumstances of the defendant in determining the amount of 
restitution,”252 but should consider these circumstances when determining the 
manner of payment.253  Some state courts must consider the possible rehabilitative 
effects of restitution orders on criminal defendants.254 
Whether or not a criminal defendant’s financial ability is considered, any earlier 
ability to pay becomes irrelevant if a criminal defendant’s resources are depleted 
after the crime but prior to any recovery order.  Pennsylvania helps victims by 
allowing for an asset preservation order relating to a criminal defendant’s property in 
anticipation of a later recovery order: 
[T]he court may enter a restraining order or injunction to preserve the 
availability of property which may be necessary to satisfy an anticipated 
restitution order . . . if . . . there is a substantial probability that:  
(A) the Commonwealth will prevail on the underlying 
criminal charges or allegation of delinquency; 
(B) restitution will be ordered exceeding $10,000 in value; 
(C) the property appears to be necessary to satisfy such 
restitution order; and 
(D) failure to enter the order will result in the property being 
. . . unavailable for payment of the anticipated restitution 
order . . . .255 
 
These standards are somewhat comparable to the standards for interlocutory 
injunctions in civil cases.256 
                                                          
 
249
 ALA. CODE § 15-18-68 (determining manner, method, or amount of restitution). 
 
250
 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.045(g) (West 2010). 
 
251
 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(6)(a) (West 2010) (statute is silent on defendant’s financial 
abilities); id. § 775.089(6)(b) (“The criminal court, at the time of enforcement of the 
restitution order, shall consider the financial resources of the defendant.”). 
 
252
 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-804(C) (2010). 
 
253
 Id. § 13-804(E).  
 
254
 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-68 (“In determining the manner, method, or amount of 
restitution to be ordered, the court may take into consideration all of the following: . . . [t]he 
anticipated rehabilitative effect on the defendant regarding the manner of restitution or the 
method of payment.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-205(e)(2) (West 2010) (“In determining the 
method of payment, the court shall take into account . . . [t]he rehabilitative effect on the 
defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of payment.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-
37-3 (West 2010) (“In determining whether to order restitution which may be complete, 
partial or nominal, the court shall take into account . . . [t]he rehabilitative effect on the 
defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of payment.”). 
 
255
 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9728(e)(2)(i) (West 2010) (the burden on the defendant 
must be outweighed by the need to preserve the property). 
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Statutes often delineate the specific losses recoverable at sentencing.  Medical 
expenses, lost wages, counseling expenses, lost or damaged property, and funeral 
expenses are often included.257  Colorado permits recoveries for “anticipated future 
expenses” as well as past losses.258  California provides for interest on crime victim 
recovery orders.259   
Some states restrict recoverable losses to actual pecuniary losses proximately 
caused by criminal conduct, thus excluding pain and suffering.  A Connecticut 
statute says: 
Restitution ordered by the court . . . shall be based on easily ascertainable 
damages for injury or loss of property, actual expenses incurred for 
treatment for injury to persons and lost wages resulting from injury.  
Restitution shall not include reimbursement for damages for mental 
anguish, pain and suffering or other intangible losses, but may include the 
costs of counseling reasonably related to the offense.260 
While punitive, pain and suffering, and loss of consortium recoveries are unavailable 
at sentencing in Georgia, criminal procedure laws do suggest that such recoveries are 
available in separate civil actions.261 
                                                          
 
256
 See PA. R. CIV. P. 1531(a) (“A court shall issue a preliminary or special injunction only 
after written notice and hearing unless it appears to the satisfaction of the court that immediate 
and irreparable injury will be sustained before notice can be given or a hearing held, in which 
case the court may issue a preliminary or special injunction without a hearing or without 
notice.  In determining whether a preliminary or special injunction should be granted and 
whether notice or a hearing should be required, the court may act on the basis of the 
averments of the pleadings or petition and may consider affidavits of parties or third persons 
or any other proof which the court may require.”); Everett v. Harron, 110 A.2d 383, 387 (Pa. 
1955) (“‘In general, these conditions are, that unless relief is granted a substantial right of the 
plaintiff will be impaired to a material degree; that the remedy at law is inadequate; and that 
injunctive relief can be applied with practical success and without imposing an impossible 
burden on the court or bringing its processes into disrepute.’” (quoting Kenyon v. City of 
Chicopee, 70 N.E.2d 241, 244-45 (Mass. 1946))). 
 
257
 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(f)(3) (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(2)(a), (b) 
(West 2010). 
 
258
 COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-602(3)(a) (West 2010) (no recoveries for loss of 
consortium, loss of future earnings, physical or mental pain and suffering and punitive 
damages). 
 
259
 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(f)(3)(G) (assessing ten percent). 
 
260
 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-28(c) (West 2010). 
 
261
 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-9 (West 2010) (“The amount of restitution ordered shall 
not exceed the victim’s damages”); id. § 17-14-3  (“[I]n addition to any other penalty imposed 
by law, a judge of any court of competent jurisdiction shall . . . order an offender to make full 
restitution . . . .”); id. § 17-14-10 (“In determining the nature and amount of restitution, the 
ordering authority shall consider . . . [t]he amount of damages . . . .”); id. § 17-14-2(9) 
(“‘Victim’ means any . . . [n]atural person or his or her personal representative or, if the victim 
is deceased, his or her estate; or . . . [a]ny firm, partnership, association, public or private 
corporation, or governmental entity . . . suffering damages caused by an offender’s lawful act 
. . . . ”); id. § 17-14-2(2) (“‘Damages’ means all special damages which a victim could recover 
against an offender in a civil action, including a wrongful death action, based on the same act 
or acts for which the offender is sentenced, except punitive damages and damages for pain and 
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In some instances, a government can be a crime victim for purposes of victim 
recovery in criminal cases.  Consider state entities that expend monies to cover 
victim injuries arising from crime.262  However, law enforcement agencies that suffer 
property losses during attempts to apprehend suspected criminals often are not 
considered crime victims at sentencing.263 
While crime victim recoveries at sentencing are not specifically addressed in the 
federal Constitution, certain crime victims under the federal Crime Victims Act have 
the “right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.”264  However, restitution 
opportunities have never been available to all victims.  For example, one court has 
ruled that plaintiffs suing under the Federal Tort Claims Act could not utilize Victim 
Rights Act protections when there is no “allegation of ongoing or contemplated 
criminal prosecution.”265  A 2010 survey of Article III federal court judges found that 
                                                          
suffering, mental anguish, or loss of consortium.  Such special damages shall not be limited by 
any law which may cap economic damages.  Special damages may include the reasonably 
determined costs of transportation to and from court proceedings related to the prosecution of 
the crime.”).  These statutes all appear in the Restitution and Distribution of Profits to Victims 
of Crimes Chapter of the Criminal Procedure Statutes. 
 
262
 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-5-3(a) (West 2010) (“[T]he court may . . . order the 
person to make restitution to the victim of the crime . . . .  The court shall base its restitution 
order upon a consideration of . . . property damages of the victim incurred as a result of the 
crime . . . medical and hospital costs incurred by the victim (before the date of sentencing) as a 
result of the crime . . . .”).  For example, in Ault v. Indiana the court held that because the 
victim was afflicted with shaken baby syndrome as a result of the defendant’s actions and the 
victim’s medical costs would be approximately $10,000 a month, most of which would be 
covered by Medicaid, restitution was to be made jointly to the victim’s mother and the State of 
Indiana.  Ault v. Indiana, 705 N.E.2d 1078, 1080-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).  The court reasoned 
that the state had no choice in its expenditure of costs and that those costs were made in 
“direct support of the victim of a crime.”  Id. at 1082.  But see Bockler v. Indiana, 908 N.E.2d 
342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that the trial court was not authorized to order restitution for 
the depreciation of rescue equipment used during an underwater search for a fleeing 
defendant). 
 
263
 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.20 (West 2010) (“When imposing sentence . . . for any 
crime . . . the court . . . shall order the defendant to make full or partial restitution . . . to any 
victim of a crime . . . .”); Wisconsin v. Haase, 716 N.W.2d 526, 530 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) 
(finding the trial court’s restitution order to the sheriff’s department for the replacement of a 
squad car was improper, reasoning that the defendant, in eluding police officers on a high 
speed chase, did not directly cause damage to the property of the sheriff’s department because 
“the loss of the squad car was a collateral expense incurred in the normal course of law 
enforcement”; the court did opine that the deputies themselves would have qualified as direct 
victims); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.18 (West 2010) (“Restitution by the offender to the 
victim of the offender’s crime . . . in an amount based on the victim’s economic loss. . . . If the 
court imposes restitution, the court may base the amount [on multiple sources] provided that 
the amount the court orders as restitution shall not exceed the amount of the economic loss 
suffered by the victim as a direct and proximate result of the commission of the offense.”); 
Ohio v. Toler, 882 N.E.2d 28, 30-33 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d 2007) (holding that the restitution 
order made to the sheriff’s department for extradition expenses could not be recovered, as 
those costs did not stem directly from the domestic violence charge on which the defendant 
was convicted). 
 
264
 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(6) (West 2010). 
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two thirds “agreed somewhat or strongly that courts should have the authority to 
order restitution for victims in all cases.”266 
In federal criminal cases, the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act specially dictates 
recoveries at sentencing for certain crimes following conviction upon trial or plea.267  
A victim is defined under the Act as one directly and proximately affected by 
criminal conduct268 as well as the legal guardian of a minor, incompetent, or 
incapacitated victim, or the representative of a deceased victim’s estate.269  The Act 
makes recoveries at sentencing mandatory under certain circumstances, including 
crimes of violence,270 offenses committed by fraud or deceit,271 and offenses 
involving the tampering of consumer products272 when an “identifiable victim or 
victims . . . suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss.”273  The Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act does not operate when “the number of identifiable victims is so large 
as to make restitution impracticable”274 or when “determining complex issues of fact 
                                                          
 
265
 Daugherty v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1286 (N.D. Okla. 2002) (“Plaintiffs’ 
claims directly against United States also fail. . . .  As the magistrate judge points out, 
plaintiff’s claim for restitution under the Victims of Crime Act borders on the frivolous.  The 
right to restitution . . . appears in the context of sentencing a convicted criminal under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3663, 3664.  There is no allegation of ongoing or contemplated criminal 
prosecution in this matter.”). 
 
266
 Marcia Coyle, Judges Give Thumbs Down to Crack, Pot, Porn Mandatory Minimums, 
NAT’L L.J., June 16, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id 
=1202462732111 (639 of 942 judges responded to U.S. Sentencing Commission survey). 
 
 
267
 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(a)(1) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when 
sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense . . . the court shall order, in addition to, or in 
the case of a misdemeanor, in addition to or in lieu of, any other penalty authorized by law, 
that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense or, if the victim is deceased, to 
the victim’s estate.”).  The Act’s limits on the types of recoveries available have been rightly 
criticized in Cassell Testimony, supra note 115, at 3-10 (stating that “consequential” and 
“remote” losses are deemed by the federal appellate courts as outside the Act). 
 
268
 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(a)(2) (“For the purposes of this section, the term ‘victim’ means a 
person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which 
restitution may be ordered including, in the case of an offense that involves as an element a 
scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, any person directly harmed by the 
defendant’s criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.”). 
 
269
 Id. § 3663A(a)(2) (“In the case of a victim who is under 18 years of age, incompetent, 
incapacitated, or deceased, the legal guardian of the victim or representative of the victim’s 
estate . . . may assume the victim’s rights under this section, but in no event shall the 
defendant be named as such representative or guardian.”). 
 
270
 Id. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(i). 
 
271
 Id. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
 
272
 Id. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(iii). 
 
273
 Id. § 3663A(c)(1)(B);  see also id. § 3663A(c)(2) (“In the case of a plea agreement that 
does not result in a conviction for an offense described in paragraph (1), this section shall 
apply only if the plea specifically states that an offense listed under such paragraph gave rise 
to the plea agreement.”). 
 
274
 Id. § 3663A(c)(3)(A). 
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related to the cause or amount of the victim’s losses would complicate or prolong the 
sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution to any victim is 
outweighed by the burden on the sentencing process.”275  
If a criminal defendant has been found guilty of criminal conduct outside of the 
Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act 
bestows upon federal courts permissive authority to award recoveries at 
sentencing.276  “Victim” is defined the same way in both the Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act and the Victim and Witness Protection Act.277  Under the Victim and 
Witness Protection Act, the court may order recoveries for losses encompassing 
property damage;278 medical, psychiatric, and psychological care for victims of sex 
crimes;279 funeral expenses;280 lost income; and child care and other expenses related 
to aiding with the prosecution.281  Furthermore, organizations designated by the 
victim or the victim’s estate can recover under this Act.282 
Under the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act, recoveries at sentencing 
need not involve crime victims.  There can be orders benefiting government 
programs where there are unidentifiable victims.283  When the government so 
                                                          
 
275
 Id. § 3663A(c)(3)(B).  There are other limits.  See Cassell Testimony, supra note 115, at 
4 (stating that certain losses are not covered and too often there are “inadequate enforcement 
tools”).  But see United States v. Masek, 588 F.3d 1283, 1290 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that 
civil settlement with victim did not foreclose additional MVRA restitution order).  
 
276
 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663  (“The court, when sentencing a defendant . . . other than an offense 
described in section 3663A(c), may order, in addition to or, in the case of a misdemeanor, in 
lieu of any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to any victim 
of such offense, or if the victim is deceased, to the victim’s estate.  The court may also order, 
if agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement, restitution to persons other than the victim of 
the offense.”). 
 
277
 See id. § 3663A(a)(2) (providing the definition of victim in the Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act); id. § 3663(a)(2) (providing the definition of victim in the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act). 
 
278
 Id. § 3663(b)(1)(B). 
 
279
 Id. § 3663(b)(2). 
 
280
 Id. § 3663(b)(3). 
 
281
 Id. § 3663(b)(4).  This Act’s limits on the types of crimes and losses covered have been 
rightly criticized in Cassell Testimony, supra note 115, at 11-16 (proposing that recoveries be 
available for victims of all federal offenses, subject to judicial discretion, and that recoverable 
losses be expanded to include a “but for” test, as well as consequential damages and attorney’s 
fees). 
 
282
 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663(b)(5) (“[I]n any case, if the victim (or if the victim is deceased, the 
victim’s estate) consents, make restitution in services in lieu of money, or make restitution to 
person or organization designated by the victim or the estate . . . .”). 
 
283
 Id. § 3663(c)(1) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law (but subject to the 
provisions of subsections (a)(1)(B)(i)(II) and (ii), (footnote omitted) when sentencing a 
defendant convicted of an offense described in section 401, 408(a), 409, 416, 420 or 422(a) of 
the Controlled Substances Act . . . in which there is no identifiable victim, the court may order 
that the defendant make restitution in accordance with this subsection.”).  See also id. § 
3663(c)(2)(A) (“An order of restitution under this subsection shall be based on the amount of 
public harm caused by the offense, as determined by the court . . . .”). 
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recovers, sixty-five percent of the total amount paid goes to state entity responsible 
for administering crime victim assistance284 and thirty-five percent goes to the “State 
entity designated to receive Federal substance abuse block grant funds.”285   
When a crime victim recovery at sentencing under the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act may “interfere with a forfeiture,” the court “shall not make an 
award.”286  This forfeiture priority stands in stark contrast to crime victim priority in 
California.287  However, under the federal Act, individual and other crime victims 
“receive full restitution before the United States.”288 
In federal district courts, monetary recoveries at sentencing are ordered without 
consideration of a defendant’s ability to pay.289  As with state statutory guidelines, a 
victim’s compensation from a collateral source can offset a recovery order under the 
Victim and Witness Protection Act.290 
There are often substantial obstacles for victims seeking recoveries in state or 
federal criminal cases.  Some exist regardless of what statutes may say about any 
affirmative duty of prosecutors to assist victims with recovery.  For example, in 
January 2010 the Oregon Secretary of State published findings of a state-wide audit 
on restitution at criminal case sentencing.291  The Secretary of State obtained 
sentencing information from criminal convictions in every Oregon county between 
July 1, 2007 and June 30, 2008.292  With the assistance of the Oregon Department of 
Justice and the Marion County District Attorney’s Office, particular crimes were 
identified as “more likely to result in economic loss,” such as assault, theft, 
homicide, robbery, and forgery.293  In this one-year span, only thirty-six percent of 
convictions involving such crimes had recovery orders.294  The auditors reviewed 
District Attorney records in four counties to learn why recoveries often were not 
                                                          
 
284
 Id. § 3663(c)(3)(A). 
 
285
 Id. § 3663(c)(3)(B). 
 
286
 Id. § 3663(c)(4). 
 
287
 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(13)(c) (“All monetary payments, monies, and property 
collected . . . shall be first applied to pay the amounts ordered as restitution to the victim.”). 
 
288
 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(i). 
 
289
 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (“In each order of restitution, the court shall order 
restitution to . . . each victim’s losses as determined by the court and without consideration of 
the economic circumstances of the defendant.”). 
 
290
 Id. § 3664(j).  Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (Section 3663A) recovery is ordered 
pursuant to the procedures in the Victim and Witness Protection Act (Section 3664) and the 
offset provision of the latter is applied to the former.  Id. § 3663A(d) (“An order of restitution 
under this section shall be issued and enforced in accordance with section 3664.”). 
 
291
 OR. SEC’Y OF STATE, AUDIT REPORT, ORDERING RESTITUTION FOR VICTIMS (2010), 
available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/audits/reports/full/2010/2010-08B.pdf [hereinafter 
AUDIT]. 
 
292
 Id. at 3. 
 
293
 Id. 
 
294
 Id.  The Secretary of State address that the statistics leave room for cases where stolen 
items had been recovered.  Id. at 4. 
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ordered.295  In half of the reviewed cases, there was no order because the victim had 
either suffered no loss or was compensated by other means.296  In one third of the 
remaining cases the victim did not provide requested information.297  In the 
remaining cases, the prosecutor did not fully investigate victim’s losses or did not 
request recoveries when losses were identified.298   
Included in the cases where the victims did not provide information were 
domestic relations disputes between criminal defendants and victims where the 
victims desired to stay with the defendants or did not wish defendants to incur 
additional financial obligations.299  In the remaining cases, the auditors noted that 
prosecutors did not send out inquiry forms, did not follow up after the inquiry forms 
had been mailed, or failed to request recoveries though losses were documented.300  
In cases where prosecutors did not request crime victim recoveries, the auditors 
noted that sometimes prosecutors forgot to request, did not notice the documentation 
of losses, and, in one case, chose not to request after considering the defendant’s 
financial situation.301  As to proposals on improving crime victim recovery at 
sentencing, many Oregon District Attorneys stated that low funding prevented them 
from allocating more personnel to investigating, verifying, and supervising crime 
victim recovery requests.302  The allocation of more existing personnel to recovery 
issues would make less personnel available to prosecute crime, which many 
prosecutors felt was their prime objective.303  While the Oregon findings are limited, 
similar problems likely face crime victims in other states. 
F.  Enforcing Monetary Recoveries for Crime Victims 
Recovery orders do not ensure actual recoveries.  For example, a prosecutor’s 
failure to charge in the information all the property stolen may make full recovery by 
the victim difficult.304  Recoveries may also be hampered by the criminal’s inability 
to pay.   
Special laws can promote more effective enforcement.  Additionally, compliance 
may be more easily secured when orders are entered pursuant to agreements.  Texas 
                                                          
 
295
 Id. at 5.  Two hundred and ten case records were reviewed (including records for Coos, 
Deschutes, and Marion counties). 
 
296
 Id. at 6. 
 
297
 Id. at 7. 
 
298
 Id.  
 
299
 Id. 
 
300
 Id. at 7-8. 
 
301
 Id. at 8. 
 
302
 Id. at 9, 15-20. 
 
303
 Id. at 9. 
 
304
 In Simmons v. Florida, for example, where a criminal defendant was charged in an 
information with stealing two ladders-valued at $100 per ladder, the appellate court found that 
the trial court’s restitution order of $3400, based on the theft of 34 ladders, was in error 
because the restitution was not “causally connected to the offense,” as there was no 
connection between much of the restitution order and the loss alleged in the information.  
Simmons v. Florida, 974 So. 2d 531, 531 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
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and Virginia promote greater opportunities for settlement recoveries by enabling 
some crime victims to address, in a safe, face-to-face setting, those who caused 
harm.  Texas trains “volunteers to act as mediators between victims, guardians of 
victims, and close relatives of deceased victims and offenders.”305  It also provides 
“mediation services . . . if requested by a victim.”306  Virginia has “a victim-offender 
reconciliation program to provide an opportunity to a victim after conviction, upon 
request and agreement of the offender, to: (1) Meet with the offender in a safe, 
controlled environment; (2) Give to the offender a summary of the effects; (3) 
Discuss a proposed restitution agreement.”307   
1.  Government Failures to Enforce Recoveries 
Governmental failures to secure and enforce recoveries benefiting crime victims 
do not prompt separate claims against government.308  A Wisconsin statute provides 
that “[n]o cause of action for money damages may arise against the state” for 
violation of victims’ rights.309  Yet, there are exceptions, as where a state’s failure 
goes beyond simple negligence.  An Arizona law provides that a “victim has the 
right to recover damages from a governmental entity responsible for the intentional, 
knowing or grossly negligent violation of the victim’s rights.”310  Incidentally, in 
Arizona, a crime victim has a constitutional right “[t]o receive prompt restitution 
from the person or persons convicted of the criminal conduct that caused the victim’s 
loss or injury.”311 
As in many states, crime victims in the federal courts do not have claims when a 
United States officer fails to honor victims’ rights.312  The federal statutory rights of 
crime victims are not to “be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the 
Attorney General or any officer under his direction.”313 
American governments can help crime victims secure monetary recoveries by 
strengthening enforcement procedures.  In Indiana, there is a crime victim rights 
                                                          
 
305
 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.13(1) (West 2010). 
 
306
 Id. art. 56.13(2). 
 
307
 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-11.4(A) (West 2010). 
 
308
 For example, a prosecutor’s failure to charge in the information all the property stolen 
may make full recovery by the victim more difficult.  See, e.g., Simmons, 974 So. 2d at 531. 
 
309
 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 950.10 (West 2010).  See also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/9 
(West 2010) (“Any act of omission or commission by any law enforcement officer, circuit 
court clerk, or State’s Attorney . . . shall not impose civil liability upon the individual . . . or 
employer.”). 
 
310
 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4437(B) (2010) (“A victim has the right to recover 
damages from a governmental entity responsible for the intentional, knowing or grossly 
negligent violation of the victim’s rights under the victims’ bill of rights, article II, § 2.1, 
Constitution of Arizona . . . .”). 
 
311
 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1. 
 
312
 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(6) (West 2010) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to 
authorize a cause of action for damages or to create, to enlarge, or to imply any duty or 
obligation to any victim or other person for the breach of which the United States or any of its 
officers or employees could be held liable in damages.”). 
 
313
 Id. § 3771(d)(6). 
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statute, including a right to restitution.314  There, a victim has standing to assert the 
crime victim rights noted in the statutes.315  By contrast, in Louisiana the crime 
victim rights statute simply says that “[n]othing . . . precludes filing for a writ of 
mandamus . . . to compel the performance of a ministerial duty required by law.”316   
Wisconsin has a different approach to enforcement.  Although a victim cannot 
seek monetary damages from governments or their agents for denials of victims’ 
rights,317 a Wisconsin statute declares that “[t]he department [of justice] may receive 
complaints, seek to mediate complaints and, with the consent of the involved parties, 
actually mediate complaints regarding the treatment of crime victims.”318  
Mistreatment can involve restitution rights.319  Following departmental action, a 
victim may request review by a crime victims’ rights board.  This board may: 
 
(a) Issue private and public reprimands of public officials . . . that violate 
the rights of crime victims . . . . 
(b) Refer to the judicial commission a violation or alleged violation by a 
judge of the rights of crime victims . . . . 
(c) Seek appropriate equitable relief on behalf of a victim . . . . 
(d) Bring civil actions to assess a forfeiture . . . .320 
 
Some state statutes speak directly to enforcement.  In Illinois, a criminal court 
order is enforceable as a civil judgment.321  In Arizona “[a] criminal restitution order 
does not expire until paid in full.”322  In Pennsylvania, “any lien obtained . . . shall 
                                                          
 
314
 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-40-5-7 (West 2010) (“A victim has the right to pursue an order of 
restitution and other civil remedies against the person convicted of a crime against the 
victim.”). 
 
315
 Id. § 35-40-2-1 (West 2010). 
 
316
 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1844(U) (2010) (with no cause of action for costs, fees, or 
damages).  See also United States v. Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding 
that victims denied rights under the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act cannot appeal denials 
of their rights except through mandamus petitions); Paul G. Cassell, Protecting Crime Victims 
in Federal Appellate Courts: The Need to Broadly Construe the Crime Victims’ Rights Act’s 
Mandamus Provision, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 599 (2010) (criticizing the mandamus approach 
and calling for broader appellate rights for victims). 
 
317
 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 950.10 (West 2010) (“No cause of action for money damages may 
arise against the state, any political subdivision of the state or any employee or agent of the 
state . . . for any act or omission in the performance of any power or duty under ch. 938 . . . or 
under article I, section 9m, of the Wisconsin constitution . . . .”).  But see id. § 950.11 (“A 
public official . . . that intentionally fails to provide a right specified under [§] 950.04(1v) to a 
victim of a crime may be subject to a forfeiture of not more than $1,000.”). 
 
318
 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 950.08(3). 
 
319
 Id. § 950.04 (“Victims of crimes have the following rights . . . [t]o restitution . . . [t]o 
recompense . . . [t]o a judgment for unpaid restitution . . . [t]o compensation . . . .”). 
 
320
 Id. § 950.09(2).  This forfeiture is allowed for intentional violations of victims’ rights 
and cannot exceed $1,000.  Id. § 950.11. 
 
321
 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-5-6(m) (West 2010) (“A restitution order . . . is a 
judgment lien . . . .”). 
 
322
 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-805(C) (West 2010). 
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maintain its priority indefinitely.”323  In Florida, “[t]he restitution obligation is not 
subject to discharge in bankruptcy.”324 
2.  Criminal Defendant’s Inability to Pay 
Crime victim recovery can also be hampered by a criminal defendant’s 
competing financial obligations.  Some states prioritize payments to crime victims 
over other obligations of the (alleged) criminal.  In Iowa, the “court shall provide for 
payments in the following order of priority: victim, fines, penalties, and surcharges, 
crime victim compensation program reimbursement, public agencies, court costs.”325  
In Arizona, the complete satisfaction of a restitution order must occur prior to 
payment of other court imposed obligations.326  In Pennsylvania at least half of the 
monies collected at sentencing must be applied to restitution for the victim.327  An 
Alaska statute says that a “claim by a victim arising out of an order of restitution . . . 
or a judgment in a civil action against an offender for damages resulting from a 
crime is a superior claim for money that would otherwise be paid to the state.”328 
One frequent enforcement mechanism is wage garnishment.  This can be pursued  
“[u]pon the entry of an order for restitution” as in Florida,329 or in the event of 
noncompliance with a crime victim recovery order, as in Arizona where garnishment 
comes “[a]fter a hearing on an order to show cause.”330  In Colorado, after an 
offender is five days late with a restitution payment, a “collections investigator 
may . . . [r]equest that the clerk of the court issue an attachment of earnings.”331 
For a wrongdoer without the resources to pay at the time of a recovery order, 
some states require that income earned through work release be applied.  In Texas, 
any salary earned in work release is paid to the sheriff who “shall deposit [it] into a 
special fund to be given to the defendant on his release after deducting . . . 
restitution.”332  In Pennsylvania, “[t]he county correctional facility . . . or the 
                                                          
 
323
 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9728(d) (West 2010). 
 
324
 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775-089(10)(b) (West 2010). 
 
325
 IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.2(1) (West 2010). 
 
326
 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-804(K) & 13-809(A) (West 2010). 
 
327
 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9728(g.1) (West 2010). 
 
328
 ALASKA. STAT. ANN. § 12.61.020 (b) (West 2010).  The Alaskan statute also provides 
that the state can collect monies otherwise owed to an offender arising out of reenactments or 
offender’s comments about a crime.  Id. § 12.61.020 (a).   
 
329
 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(12)(a)(1).  See also 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-5-6(h) 
(“[t]he judge may enter an order of withholding”). 
 
330
 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-812(A). 
 
331
 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-18.5-105(3)(b) (West 2010).  See also id. § 18-1.3-602(1) 
(“‘Collections investigator’ means a person employed by the judicial department whose 
primary responsibility is to administer, enforce, and collect on court orders or judgments 
entered with respect to fines, fees, restitution, or any other accounts receivable of the court, 
judicial district, or judicial department.”).   
 
332
 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.031(b)(3) (West 2010). 
44https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss4/5
2010] MONETARY RECOVERIES FOR STATE CRIME VICTIM  863 
 
Department of Corrections shall be authorized to make monetary deductions from 
inmate personal accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution.”333  
Some states also statutorily allow for interception of future financial resources.  
Arizona provides that “[a]ny monies . . . owed by this state to a person who is under 
a restitution order shall be assigned first to discharge the restitution order, including 
any tax refund.”334  Maryland speaks to a wrongdoer winning the lottery, requiring 
“the State Lottery Agency to withhold the prize and pay it towards the restitution 
obligor’s restitution arrearage.”335 
Several states, anticipating that a wrongdoer may enter into a “notoriety of 
crimes” contract, seek to prevent unjust enrichment.  Maryland requires that money 
be paid “over to the Attorney General . . . that . . . otherwise would be owed to the 
defendant.”336  The Attorney General is then mandated to “deposit money 
received . . . in an interest bearing escrow account337 . . . for the benefit of . . . the 
victim338 . . . [who] has been awarded restitution.”339 
In the event of nonpayment, some states have established specific oversight 
duties to assist crime victims.  For example, Georgia mandates:  
[T]he clerk of court or the probation or parole officer . . . whoever is 
responsible for collecting restitution, shall review the case not less 
frequently than twice yearly . . . .  If it is determined . . . that restitution is 
not being paid as ordered, a written report of the violation shall be filed 
with the court . . . .340   
Alabama mandates a monthly report by the clerk to the prosecutor and probation 
office.341  Arizona simply requires the clerk to notify the prosecutor, the court, and 
the victim of any default on a restitution order.342 
Once a trial court is aware of noncompliance, a hearing is usually held to 
determine whether nonpayment was willful.  In Colorado, the “collections 
investigator may . . . [r]equest that the court issue a notice to show cause requiring 
the defendant to appear . . . and show cause why the required . . . payments were not 
made.”343  In Maine, an “offender who has . . . defaulted . . . shall be returned to 
court for further disposition.”344 
                                                          
 
333
 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9728(b)(5) (West 2010). 
 
334
 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-804(K). 
 
335
 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-618(b)(3) (West 2010). 
 
336
 Id. § 11-622(2). 
 
337
 Id. § 11-624(a). 
 
338
 Id. §11-624(b). 
 
339
 Id. §11-624(c)(1)(iii). 
 
340
 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-14(c) (West 2010).   
 
341
 ALA. CODE § 15-23-82 (West 2010). 
 
342
 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-810(A). 
 
343
 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-18.5-105(3)(d) (West 2010).  See also id. § 18-1.3-602(1) 
(“‘Collections investigator’ means a person employed by the judicial department whose 
primary responsibility is to administer, enforce, and collect on court orders or judgments 
entered with respect to fines, fees, restitution, or any other accounts receivable of the court, 
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Noncompliance caused by financial inability is generally met with leniency.  In 
Illinois, criminal courts may grant time extensions to those who unintentionally fail 
to pay.345  In Maine, “[i]f it appears that the default is excusable, the court may give 
the offender additional time for payment or may reduce the amount of each 
installment.”346  In Pennsylvania, when there is a default due to lack of resources, the 
appropriate authority may “sentence the defendant to a period of community 
service.”347  Some have suggested that “[v]ictims can have input into the type and 
location of the community service performed.”348 
In cases of willful noncompliance with a criminal court sentencing order 
involving crime victim recovery, the order is generally enforceable as any civil case 
judgment.349  A court may issue a contempt order, extend probation, or order jail 
time with or without work release.350  Some states expressly allow probation 
revocation for an intentional default.351  In Maryland, “compliance with the judgment 
of restitution . . . shall be a condition of work release . . . [and] of probation.”352   
G.  The Effects of Forfeitures on Crime Victim Recoveries 
While recoveries through state supported funds are available to some crime 
victims, civil and criminal case recoveries against actual, accused, or alleged 
                                                          
judicial district, or judicial department.”); id. § 16-18.5-104(3)(a) (“Upon referral . . . the 
collections investigator shall conduct an investigation into the financial ability of the 
defendant to pay the restitution . . . .”). 
 
344
 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1329(1) (West 2010). 
 
345
 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-5-6(i) (West 2010). 
 
346
 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1329(3)(B) (2010). 
 
347
 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9730(b)(3) (West 2010). 
 
348
 Office of Justice Programs, Financial Assistance for Victims of Crime, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/assist/nvaa99/chap5-2.htm (last visited March 3, 2011) 
(suggestion by Office for Victims of Crime).  “The Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) was 
established by the 1984 Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) to oversee diverse programs that 
benefit victims of crime.  OVC provides substantial funding to state victim assistance and 
compensation programs . . . [and] supports trainings designed to educate criminal justice and 
allied professionals regarding the rights and needs of crime victims.”  Office for Victims of 
Crime, Welcome to the Office for Victims of Crime, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/welcovc/welcome.html (last visited March 3, 2011). 
 
349
 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-18.5-105(3)(c) (“Whenever a defendant fails to 
make a payment of restitution within five days after the date that the payment is due . . . in 
addition to any other remedy, the collections investigator may . . . (b) Request that the clerk of 
the court issue an attachment of earnings requiring that a certain portion . . . be withheld and 
applied to any unpaid restitution . . . .  An attachment of earnings . . . shall be enforceable in 
the same manner as a garnishment in a civil action. . . .  (c) Request that the clerk of the court 
issue a writ of execution, writ of attachment, or other civil process to collect upon a judgment 
. . . .”). 
 
350
 See, e.g., id. § 16-18.5-105(3)(d)(I)-(IV). 
 
351
 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.55.051(a) (West 2010) (where restitution was a 
condition of probation); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-804(E) (West 2010). 
 
352
 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-607(a)(1)(ii)-(iii) (West 2010). 
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criminals are available to many more victims.  Civil cases may proceed before, 
during, or after criminal cases.  When simultaneously pursued, however, criminal 
cases may prompt stays of related civil cases.353  Criminal case recoveries are usually 
considered at sentencing. 
As actual, accused, or alleged criminals often have only limited assets, crime 
victims at times compete with others for access to these assets.  Governments claim 
direct access through forfeitures and fines.354  Criminals may seek access to retain 
legal counsel, to secure medical treatment, or to buy goods.  Some state forfeiture 
laws expressly disallow funds used for criminal defense.355  The conflicting interests 
in accessing the assets of actual, accused, and alleged criminals can be easily 
illustrated. 
                                                          
 
353
 See Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1979) (reversing the 
district court’s decision to dismiss a criminal defendant’s libel claim, with a remand ordering 
that civil discovery be stayed, upon weighing the civil defendant’s discovery rights and the 
criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Armstrong v. 
Tanaka, 228 P.3d 79 (Alaska 2010) (employing the weighing test in Wehling to find that a 
stay of the civil proceeding was appropriate); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1311(1)(b) (McKinney 2010) 
(“An action relating to a pre-conviction forfeiture crime need not be grounded upon 
conviction of a pre-conviction forfeiture crime, provided, however, that if the action is not 
grounded upon such a conviction, it shall be necessary in the action for the claiming authority 
to prove the commission of a pre-conviction forfeiture crime by clear and convincing 
evidence.  An action under this paragraph shall be stayed during the pendency of a criminal 
action which is related to it; provided, that upon motion of a defendant in the forfeiture action 
or the claiming authority, a court may, in the interest of justice and for good cause, and with 
the consent of all parties, order that the forfeiture action proceed despite the pending criminal 
action; and provided that such stay shall not prevent the granting or continuance of any 
provisional remedy provided under this article or any other provision of law.”).  But see 
Morgenthau v. Basbus, 890 N.Y.S.2d 43 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (holding that defendant was 
not permitted to stay a civil forfeiture proceeding until the disposition of the defendant’s 
appeal of a criminal case conviction, because the appeal in a criminal proceeding is separate 
from the criminal action itself that would stay the civil forfeiture proceeding). 
 
354
 Not all asset forfeitures arise from criminal acts.  See, e.g., People v. Keil, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 600 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (five year firearms forfeiture for mental health care patient 
who would likely use firearms in unsafe ways). 
 
355
 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/12 (West 2010) (“Nothing in this Act shall apply to 
property which constitutes reasonable bona fide attorney’s fees . . . .”); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 54-36h(d) (West 2010) (“Notwithstanding [money or property relating to controlled 
substances crimes or money laundering] . . . no moneys or property used or intended to be 
used by the owner thereof to pay legitimate attorney’s fees in connection with his defense in a 
criminal prosecution shall be subject to forfeiture under this section.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
4106(a)(5)(A) (West 2010) (“An interest in property acquired in good faith by an attorney as 
reasonable payment or to secure payment for legal services in a criminal matter relating to 
violations of this act or for the reimbursement of reasonable expenses related to the legal 
services is exempt from forfeiture unless before the interest was acquired the attorney knew of 
a judicial determination of probable cause that the property is subject to forfeiture.”); N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. § 1311(12) (McKinney 2010) (“Property acquired in good faith by an attorney as 
payment for the reasonable and bona fide fees of legal services or reimbursement of 
reasonable and bona fide expenses related to the representation of a defendant in connection 
with a civil or criminal forfeiture proceeding or a related criminal matter, shall be exempt 
from a judgment of forfeiture.”). 
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Assume a person is allegedly selling illegal drugs from his home, which itself 
was not bought with the proceeds from any crime.  Assume also that on the day of 
one illegal drug deal, the person, upon completing a transaction with a client, robs 
the client’s friend who was merely transporting the client with the friend’s car and 
who had no idea about any drug deal.  The robbery victim likely has remedies that 
can access much of the robber’s assets, including his house.  The robbery victim 
would certainly be entitled to seek return of the actual money stolen, assuming 
proper identification.356   
Unlike the stolen money, the victim would have to compete with others for 
access to the robber’s other assets, like the house.  For example, other homeowners 
in the same neighborhood as the robber/drug dealer may have suffered from the drug 
dealing.  Thus, they may have a nuisance suit involving the house available to them.  
The robbery victim may also have to compete with the government for access to the 
robber/drug dealer’s assets, because the government can often seek the forfeiture of 
property used in an illegal transaction.357   
The alleged drug dealer also has an interest in accessing his own house and the 
alleged stolen money, at least until a crime has been proven.  While this person may 
not be able to easily use the stolen money or drug trafficking proceeds in retaining 
legal counsel, other property, like the house, can be more easily used. 
 The government and private parties other than crime victims may claim the 
different assets of actual, accused, and alleged criminals.  Forfeitures to governments 
of certain assets are authorized under both federal and state laws.  Under federal 
statutes, there can be civil in rem forfeitures and criminal forfeitures.358  Similar 
forfeitures are typically available under state statutes.  Moreover, in some states 
there can be administrative and civil in personam forfeitures. 
Under federal statute, property used in a crime may be seized through a civil in 
rem forfeiture.359  Unlike a criminal forfeiture,360 conviction is not a necessary 
element.  Thus, as with firearm forfeitures, acquittals may not result in the return of 
seized property.361 
                                                          
 
356
 The victim, in some circumstances, may have to compete with the government for the 
victim’s own stolen money.  For instance, federal law authorizes the federal government to 
seize “substitute assets” in place of forfeitable assets that cannot be located, are beyond the 
jurisdiction of the court, or have been sold or given to a third party.  21 U.S.C.A. § 853(p) 
(West 2010) (“substitute assets” include assets that have been commingled with other property 
that cannot easily be divided).  See also United States v. Alamoudi, 452 F.3d 310, 315 (4th 
Cir. 2006) (“[A]n order authorizing forfeiture of substitute assets pursuant to § 853(p) does 
not” require a jury determination because it does not at all increase the amount of forfeiture.). 
 
357
 Von Hofe v. United States, 492 F.3d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (Where the state 
government filed criminal drug charges against the defendants, the federal government, 
instead of filing criminal charges, filed a civil in rem forfeiture proceeding against the 
defendants’ house, where approximately sixty five potted marijuana plants had been found). 
 
358
 18 U.S.C.A. § 981 (West 2010). 
 
359
 Id. 
 
360
 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(a) (West 2010) (“Any person convicted of a violation . . . punishable 
by imprisonment for more than one year shall forfeit to the United States . . . .”). 
 
361
 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(d)(1) (“Any firearm or ammunition involved in or used in any 
knowing violation of subsection (a)(4), (a)(6), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), or (k) of section 922 
[regarding unlawful acts involving firearms] . . . shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture . . .   
 
48https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss4/5
2010] MONETARY RECOVERIES FOR STATE CRIME VICTIM  867 
 
In a state civil in rem forfeiture proceeding, property may be seized pending the 
disposition of a related criminal action; if a person is not convicted, a civil in rem 
forfeiture may still proceed.362  If a person is criminally convicted, issue preclusion 
can operate.363 
Some state statutes also provide for civil in personam forfeitures.364  Unlike civil 
in rem proceedings, where only property involved in criminal conduct is subject to 
forfeiture,365 civil in personam proceedings may involve the forfeitures of assets 
unrelated to illegal conduct.366   
                                                          
Provided, That upon acquittal of the owner or possessor, or dismissal of the charges against 
him other than upon motion of the Government prior to trial, or lapse of or court termination 
of the restraining order to which he is subject, the seized or relinquished firearms or 
ammunition shall be returned forthwith to the owner or possessor . . . unless the return of the 
firearms or ammunition would place the owner or possessor . . . in violation of the law.”); 
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984) (“Congress in fact 
drafted § 924(d) to cover a broader range of conduct than is proscribed by the criminal 
provisions of § 922(a)(1) . . . .  Because the sanction embodied in § 924(d) is not limited to 
criminal misconduct, the forfeiture remedy cannot be said to be co-extensive with the criminal 
penalty.  What overlap there is between the two sanctions is not sufficient to persuade us that 
the forfeiture proceeding may not legitimately be viewed as civil in nature . . . .  We 
accordingly conclude that the forfeiture mechanism set forth in § 924(d) is not an additional 
penalty for the commission of a criminal act, but rather a separate civil sanction, remedial in 
nature. . . .  We hold that a gun owner’s acquittal on criminal charges involving firearms does 
not preclude a subsequent in rem forfeiture proceeding against those firearms under § 
924(d).”); United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Civil forfeiture is an in 
rem proceeding. . . .  The innocence of the owner is irrelevant—it is enough that the property 
was involved in a violation to which forfeiture attaches.”). 
 
362
 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-49(v) (West 2010) (“An acquittal or dismissal in a criminal 
proceeding does not preclude civil proceedings under this [forfeiture] article.”); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 712A-11(6) (West 2010) (“An acquittal or dismissal in a criminal proceeding shall not 
preclude civil proceedings under this [forfeiture] chapter.”).  However, in some jurisdictions, 
an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal action can force the dismissal of the related forfeiture 
action.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-307(1.6) (West 2010) (“Upon acquittal or dismissal of 
a criminal action against a person named in a forfeiture action related to the criminal action, 
unless the forfeiture action was brought pursuant to one or more of paragraphs (a) to (f) of 
subsection (1.7) [which includes a defendant’s deferred sentence, or the defendant waiving the 
conviction requirement, among others], the forfeiture action shall be dismissed . . . .”); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.460(2) (West 2010) (“Following conviction . . . the court shall 
conduct an ancillary hearing to forfeit property if requested by any party other than the 
defendant or Commonwealth.”). 
 
363
 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-49(r) (West 2010) (“A defendant convicted in any 
criminal proceeding is precluded from later denying the essential allegations of the criminal 
offense of which the defendant was convicted . . . . [A] conviction results from a verdict or 
plea of guilty, including a plea of nolo contendere.”). 
 
364
 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4312(A) (West 2010) (“If a forfeiture is authorized by 
law, it shall be ordered by a court on proceedings by the state in an in personam civil or 
criminal action . . . .”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4114 (West 2010) (“If a forfeiture is authorized 
by this act, it shall be ordered by the court in the in personam action.  The action shall be in 
addition to or in lieu of in rem forfeiture procedures.”). 
 
365
 HAW. REV. STAT. § 712A-12(9) (“In accordance with its findings at the [forfeiture] 
hearing, the court shall order an interest in property returned or conveyed to the claimant, if 
any, who has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant’s interest is not 
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In both federal and state proceedings, in rem forfeitures can be either challenged 
or unchallenged.  Forfeitures go unchallenged when no one steps up to claim 
ownership in the assets seized.367  Generally, states require there that there be a 
judicial determination before a challenged forfeiture is declared final.368  However, a 
judicial determination is not always required before an unchallenged forfeiture.369  
Unchallenged forfeitures that do not require judicial determinations are typically 
considered “administrative forfeitures.”370  Not to be confused with the quasi-judicial 
actions of administrative agencies, administrative forfeiture occurs when a law 
enforcement agency declares assets legally forfeited without a judicial 
determination.371  An unchallenged forfeiture, that is, one to which there is no 
objection raised, does not necessarily result in an administrative forfeiture.  Some 
states require a judicial determination in certain instances of asset forfeiture even 
when no objections are filed.372   
                                                          
subject to forfeiture.  The court shall order all other property, including all interests in the 
property, forfeited to the State . . . .”). 
 
366
 See id. § 712A-14 (“The court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of an in 
personam civil or criminal defendant up to the value of the subject property if any of the 
property subject to forfeiture . . . [c]annot be located . . . [or] [h]as been transferred or 
conveyed to, sold to, or deposited with a third party . . . .”). 
 
367
 See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/6(C)(1) (West 2010) (“Any person claiming 
an interest in property . . . may . . . file a verified claim with the State’s Attorney expressing 
his or her interest in the property.”). 
 
368
 DEE R. EDGEWORTH, ASSET FORFEITURE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN STATE AND 
FEDERAL COURTS 35 (2d ed. 2008) (“[N]onjudicial forfeiture does not have widespread use 
within the state forfeiture system.”). 
 
369
 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 712A-10(11) (“In the event a claim and bond has not been 
filed in substantial compliance with this section, or if the attorney general, with sole 
discretion, determines that remission or mitigation is not warranted, the attorney general shall 
order forfeited all property seized for forfeiture.”).  But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
4309(B) (“If the state fails to initiate forfeiture proceedings against property seized . . . such 
property shall be released from its seizure for forfeiture on the request of an owner or interest 
holder . . . .”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/6 (West 2010) (“If no claim is filed . . . the State’s 
Attorney shall declare the property forfeited . . . .”). 
 
370
 EDGEWORTH, supra note 368, at 3 (“Administrative forfeiture entails forfeiture of 
property without formal court action.”). 
 
371
 Id. 
 
372
 Compare, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17.30.116(b)-(c) (West 2010) (“Upon service or 
publication of notice of commencement of a forfeiture action under this section, a person 
claiming interest in the property shall file within 30 days after the service or publication, a 
notice of claim setting out the nature of the interest, the date it was acquired, the consideration 
paid, and an answer to the state’s allegations.  If a claim and answer is not filed within the 
time specified, the property described in the state’s allegation must be ordered forfeited to the 
state without further proceedings or showings . . . .  Questions of fact or law raised by a notice 
of forfeiture action and answer of a claimant in an action commenced under this section must 
be determined by the court sitting without a jury.”), and MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-176(6) 
(West 2010) (“If no petition to contest forfeiture is timely filed, the attorney for the seizing 
law enforcement agency shall prepare a written declaration of forfeiture of the subject 
property and the forfeited property shall be used, distributed or disposed of . . . .”), with ARIZ. 
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Thus, some uncontested forfeitures must be judicially approved.  Additionally, 
some states require judicial determinations when the value of seized assets exceeds a 
certain monetary amount.373  Monetary amounts range from $10,000 in Mississippi374 
to $500,000 at the federal level.375  A judicial determination is also mandated at 
times when the seized asset is real property.376  
At the state level, the civil forfeiture of a criminal’s assets can assist in 
compensating a crime victim.  For example, in Arizona a victim may apply to the 
government for compensation from the defendant’s forfeited assets prior to final 
judgment.377  In this situation the victim must state under penalty of perjury, inter 
alia, the nature of the economic loss,378 the supporting facts,379 and the requested 
amount.380  Upon request, the court “shall hold a hearing to establish whether there is 
a factual basis for the request.”381  The burden is on the victim to establish “by a 
preponderance of the evidence” that he or she “is an injured person who sustained 
economic loss.”382  If the government can show by a preponderance of the evidence 
                                                          
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4314(A) (“If no petitions for remission or mitigation or claims are 
timely filed or if no petitioner files a claim in the court within thirty days after mailing of a 
declaration of forfeiture, the attorney for the state shall apply to the court for an order of 
forfeiture and allocation of forfeited property. . . .  On the state’s written application showing 
jurisdiction, notice and facts sufficient to demonstrate probable cause for forfeiture . . . the 
court shall order the property forfeited to the state.”). 
 
373
 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-176(1), (6) (“When any property other than a 
controlled substance, raw material or paraphernalia, the value of which does not exceed Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000), is seized under the Uniform Controlled Substances Law, the 
property may be forfeited by the administrative forfeiture procedures provided for in this 
section . . . .  If no petition to contest forfeiture is timely filed, the attorney for the seizing law 
enforcement agency shall prepare a written declaration of forfeiture of the subject property 
and the forfeited property shall be used, distributed or disposed of . . . .”). 
 
374
 Id. § 41-29-176(1). 
 
375
 19 U.S.C.A. § 1607 (West 2010).  See also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/6 (“If non-
real property that exceeds $20,000 in value excluding the value of any conveyance, or if real 
property is seized . . . the State’s Attorney shall institute judicial in rem forfeiture proceedings 
. . . .”). 
 
376
 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 985(a) (West 2010); EDGEWORTH, supra note 368, at 36 (“Neither the 
state nor the federal systems permit the forfeiture of real property administratively.”).  But see 
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 150/6(D), (C)(2) (“If no claim is filed . . . the State’s Attorney 
shall declare the property forfeited”; however, “if a claimant files the claim . . . then the 
State’s Attorney shall institute judicial in rem forfeiture proceeding.”). 
 
377
 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4311(I) (“An injured person may submit a request for 
compensation from forfeited property to the court at any time before the earlier of the entry of 
a final judgment or an application for an order of the forfeiture of the property, or if a 
hearing . . . is held, not less than thirty days before the hearing.”). 
 
378
 Id. § 13-4311(I)(4). 
 
379
 Id. § 13-4311(I)(5). 
 
380
 Id. § 13-4311(I)(7). 
 
381
 Id. § 13-4311(J). 
 
382
 Id. 
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that the property is subject to forfeiture,383 and the court finds that the “requestor is 
an injured person,”384 the court then “shall determine the amount of the injured 
person’s economic loss caused by the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture of the 
designated property.”385  As long as the property is “not contraband and is not altered 
or designed for use in conduct giving rise to forfeiture,” the State’s Attorney “shall 
sell the property” and “shall apply the resulting balance to compensate the injured 
person’s economic loss in the amount found by the court.”386  In the event that there 
is insufficient money from the sale to compensate all victims, the money is 
distributed among victims at the court’s discretion.387  In the event that there is a 
surplus, “the attorney for the state shall transmit ten per cent of the remaining 
balance . . . to the Arizona criminal justice commission for deposit in the victim 
compensation and assistance fund.”388 
Federal statutes also provide for criminal forfeitures of certain assets.389   A 
federal criminal forfeiture proceeding is an in personam proceeding while a federal 
civil forfeiture proceeding is an in rem proceeding.  Unlike in civil in rem 
forfeitures, the property holder in federal criminal in personam forfeiture 
proceedings must first be convicted of a related offense.390    One benefit of a 
criminal forfeiture case is its broader scope.  A criminal forfeiture order can be 
entered as a money judgment, a judgment against specific property, or a judgment 
against substitute assets.391  Because a criminal forfeiture is part of a criminal case 
                                                          
 
383
 See, e.g., id. § 13-4311(M) (“At the hearing, the state has the burden of establishing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the property is subject to forfeiture under section 13-4304 
. . . .”); id. § 13-4304 (“all property, including all interest in such property, described in a 
statute providing for its forfeiture is subject to forfeiture”).  Exemptions from forfeiture are 
found at id. § 13-4304(1)-(5).  
 
384
 Id. § 13-4311(N)(3). 
 
385
 Id. 
 
386
 Id. § 13-4311(N)(3)(a). 
 
387
 Id. § 13-4311(N)(3)(b). 
 
388
 Id. § 13-4311(N)(3)(c).  See also id. § 13-4311(N)(3)(d) (“the attorney for the state shall 
deposit the remainder of the balance, if any, in an appropriate anti-racketeering revolving 
fund”). 
 
389
 18 U.S.C.A. § 982(a)(1) (West 2010) (“The court, in imposing sentence on a person 
convicted . . . shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or 
personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable to such property.”).  See also 21 
U.S.C.A. § 853 (West 2010) (drug forfeiture); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (RICO offenses). 
 
390
 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (“As soon as practical after a verdict or finding of guilty, 
or after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is accepted, on any count in an indictment or 
information regarding which criminal forfeiture is sought, the court must determine what 
property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable statute.”).  
 
391
 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(a) (in authorizing forfeiture under RICO offenses, “[w]hoever 
violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned . . . or both, and shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of 
State law . . . (1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of section 
1962; (2) any (A) interest in; (B) security of; (C) claim against; or (D) property or contractual 
right of any kind affording a source of influence over; any enterprise which the person 
established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of 
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sentence, it does not prompt a new case.  Unlike the conviction itself, the criminal 
forfeiture order can be based on a preponderance of the evidence.392  Typically, the 
government must state in the indictment that it intends to seek criminal forfeiture at 
any later sentencing.393  The federal government can first seize assets in a civil in 
rem forfeiture and then move those assets into a criminal forfeiture proceeding upon 
conviction.394 
Under federal statute, after a guilty verdict or guilty plea, a criminal court judge 
can determine what assets listed in the indictment may be forfeited.395  If third parties 
seek access to the same assets, a hearing is required.  This hearing is usually held by 
the same judge who presided over the criminal case.396 
When relevant assets have not yet been seized during a civil in rem forfeiture 
proceeding, under federal statute the government can seek interlocutory relief as to 
                                                          
section 1962; and (3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the 
person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection 
in violation of section 1962”); id. § 1963(b) (“Property subject to criminal forfeiture under this 
section includes (1) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in land; 
and (2) tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests, 
claims, and securities.”); id. §1963(m) (“If any of the property described in subsection (a), as a 
result of any act or omission of the defendant (1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due 
diligence; (2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party; (3) has been 
placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court; (4) has been substantially diminished in value; or 
(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without difficulty; the 
court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to the value of any 
property described in paragraphs (1) through (5).”). 
 
392
 See United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1082 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Cherry, 
330 F.3d 658, 669-70 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 42 (1995)); 
United States v. Myers, 21 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 1994).  In some state cases, a criminal 
forfeiture action must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 
186.5(d) (West 2010).  Elsewhere, proof by a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient.  
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-708(d) (West 2010). 
 
393
 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(a); United States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013, 1024 (2d 
Cir. 1980). 
 
394
 EDGEWORTH, supra note 368, at 186 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(a)(3)(B) (West 2010)). 
 
395
 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (“As soon as practical after a verdict or finding of guilty, 
or after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is accepted, on any count in an indictment or 
information regarding which criminal forfeiture is sought, the court must determine what 
property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable statute.  If the government seeks 
forfeiture of specific property, the court must determine whether the government has 
established the requisite nexus between the property and the offense.  If the government seeks 
a personal money judgment, the court must determine the amount of money that the defendant 
will be ordered to pay.”). 
 
396
 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(c)(1) (“If . . . a third party files a petition asserting an interest in 
the property to be forfeited, the court must conduct an ancillary proceeding, but no ancillary 
proceeding is required to the extent that the forfeiture consists of a money judgment.”).  See 
also United States v. Lazarenko, 610 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that 
bona fide purchaser status, achieved before criminal conduct occurred, can outweigh 
government’s forfeiture interest in same property). 
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the assets, including a temporary injunction.397  Such a request for relief can be made 
when a civil in rem forfeiture complaint is filed.398  After an opportunity for hearing, 
interlocutory relief can be ordered if “there is substantial probability that the United 
States will prevail on the issue of forfeiture and . . . failure to enter the order will 
result in the property being destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or 
otherwise be made unavailable for forfeiture”399 and if “the need to preserve the 
availability of the property through the entry of the requested order outweighs the 
hardship on any party against whom the order is to be entered.”400  Interlocutory 
relief can be granted to the government without notice under certain 
circumstances.401 
Some states also permit interlocutory relief in civil in rem forfeiture 
proceedings.402  Such relief may even come in the form of a sale of an asset after 
notice is given should it be found that the asset will significantly depreciate in value 
if not sold.403 
                                                          
 
397
 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(j)(1) (West 2010) (“Upon application of the United States, the court 
may enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of satisfactory performance 
bonds, create receiverships, appoint conservators, custodians, appraisers, accountants, or 
trustees, or take any other action to seize, secure, maintain, or preserve the availability of 
property subject to civil forfeiture . . . .”). 
 
398
 18 U.S.C.A. § 983(j)(1)(A). 
 
399
 Id. § 983(j)(1)(B)(i). 
 
400
 Id. § 983(j)(1)(B)(ii). 
 
401
 Id. § 983(j)(3) (“A temporary restraining order under this subsection may be entered 
upon application of the United States without notice or opportunity for a hearing when a 
complaint has not yet been filed with respect to the property, if the United States demonstrates 
that there is probable cause to believe that the property with respect to which the order is 
sought is subject to civil forfeiture and that provision of notice will jeopardize the availability 
of the property for forfeiture.  Such a temporary order shall not expire not more than 14 days 
after the date on which it is entered, unless extended for good cause shown or unless the party 
against whom it is entered consents to an extension for a longer period.”). 
 
402
 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4312(D) (West 2010) (“[A] temporary restraining order 
under this section may be entered on application of the state without notice or an opportunity 
for a hearing if the state demonstrates both that . . . [t]here is probable cause to believe that the 
property with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of final judgment or 
conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this title [and] [p]rovision of notice will jeopardize 
the availability of the property for forfeiture.  A temporary restraining order expires within ten 
days after the date on which it is entered unless the party against whom it is entered consents 
to an extension for a longer period or unless after commencing a hearing the court enters or is 
considering a preliminary injunction.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4114(b) (West 2010) (“The 
court may issue a temporary restraining order in an action under this section on application of 
the plaintiff’s attorney, without notice or an opportunity for a hearing, if the plaintiff’s 
attorney demonstrates that . . . [t]here is probable cause to believe that in the event of a final 
judgment, the property involved would be subject to forfeiture under the provisions of this act; 
and . . . [a] provision of notice would jeopardize the availability of the property for 
forfeiture.”).  
 
403
 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 17.30.120 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-386.7 
(West 2010). 
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A restraining order against the use of assets that may be forfeited can interfere 
with the owner’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  In Caplin & Drysdale, Charted 
v. United States, a criminal defendant allegedly dealt in illegal drugs.404  The trial 
court entered a restraining order preventing the defendant from transferring any 
assets listed in the indictment that could be subject to a later criminal forfeiture.405  
The defendant moved to allow some of the assets to be used to pay counsel, but then 
pled guilty before any hearing.406  Part of the plea agreement involved forfeiture of 
all the assets listed in the indictment.407  The listed assets in the forfeiture order 
included “virtually all assets,” including real estate and $200,000 in U.S. currency.408  
Because of the plea, the trial court denied the motion.409  The defendant’s attorney 
then requested that the court set aside a portion of the forfeited assets, arguing that 
assets used for attorney’s fees should be exempt from forfeiture.410  If they were not, 
the attorney argued that the statute would be in violation of the Sixth Amendment.411  
The trial court granted the request but the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed.412  
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “a defendant has no Sixth Amendment 
right to spend another person’s money for services rendered by an attorney, even if 
those funds are the only way that the defendant will be able to retain the attorney of 
his choice.”413 
While there may be no Sixth Amendment interest when the government secures 
assets in advance of any fee issue, right to counsel issues can arise when the 
government seizes assets that are unconnected to criminal conduct and are needed to 
pay counsel.  In United States v. Farmer, U.S. Customs agents seized a criminal 
defendant’s cars and other assets, including about $540,000, believing the items 
                                                          
 
404
 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 619 (1989). 
 
405
 Id. at 620.  The forfeiture in this case was sought under the criminal forfeiture statute for 
acts in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West 2010) (continuing criminal enterprise charges, 
which were later held to be repealed by implication in United States v. Stitt, 552 F.3d 345, 352 
(4th Cir. 2008)). 
 
406
 Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 621. 
 
407
 Id. 
 
408
 Id. at 620-21. 
 
409
 Id. at 621. 
 
410
 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) (West 2010) (providing for forfeiture to the government even 
when the defendant had previously transferred to a third party, unless the transferee can 
establish that he was a bona fide purchaser of the property in question). 
 
411
 Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 623-24. 
 
412
 Id. at 622. 
 
413
 Id. at 626.  In the plurality opinion of the court, Justice White hypothesized that a bank 
robber would not be able to use the proceeds of his theft of the bank’s money to retain an 
attorney, as the defendant is not the rightful owner of the funds.  Id.  Justice White also 
believed that the defense attorney would be ethically barred from accepting stolen property, as 
an attorney would not be allowed to accept instrumentalities of a crime as payment from a 
criminal defendant, such as stolen property, as payment for legal services.  Id. (“‘The privilege 
to practice law is not a license to steal.’” (quoting Laska v. United States, 82 F.2d 672, 677 
(10th Cir. 1936))). 
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were connected to counterfeiting.414  In the two years that followed, the defendant 
twice unsuccessfully moved to have the assets returned through the pendency of the 
criminal investigation.415  A civil forfeiture action was never commenced.416  An 
indictment was finally issued, which included an action for criminal forfeiture of the 
seized assets.417  The criminal defendant then moved for a hearing, seeking release of 
some of the seized funds so that he could pay an attorney.418  He claimed that the 
seizure effectively put him out of business and that at least some of the assets were 
unrelated to any alleged crimes.419  The appellate court, citing Caplin & Drysdale, 
Chartered v. United States, stated that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
supports an individual’s “right to spend his own legitimate, nonforfeitable assets” 
even though crime proceeds cannot be used to retain defense counsel.420  The court 
reasoned that while it is “clear that there is no Sixth Amendment right for a 
defendant to obtain counsel using tainted funds,” a criminal defendant “still 
possesses a qualified Sixth Amendment right to use wholly legitimate funds to hire 
the attorney of his choice.”421  The Farmer court held that due process demanded 
that the defendant be able to challenge the seizure of the assets because of the 
defendant’s significant interest in obtaining a pretrial hearing regarding allegedly 
unrelated funds, the high risk of “erroneous deprivation” of the defendant’s interest 
in the absence of any hearing, and lack of an undue burden on the government.422 
Thus, forfeiture laws allow governments to seize only assets tied to alleged 
criminal acts.  It appears there could be a Sixth Amendment issue in a civil suit 
paralleling a criminal proceeding when a crime victim seeks to preserve a criminal 
defendant’s assets that are unconnected to alleged criminal acts.  Thus, a criminal 
defendant’s assets that are unrelated to the alleged criminal acts may be unavailable 
for the purpose of securing later crime victim recovery.  However, in Manning v. 
Manning, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a civil plaintiff’s temporary 
injunction against a criminal defendant’s assets does not violate the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel when that defendant’s assets, though unrelated to 
criminal acts, were already the subject of an earlier judicial order.423  There, the 
criminal defendant and the victim were divorced.424  Under the terms of the divorce, 
                                                          
 
414
 United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800, 801 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 
415
 Id.  The investigation appeared to have lasted nearly two years without an indictment 
filed.  Id. 
 
416
 Id. 
 
417
 Id. at 801-02. 
 
418
 Id. 
 
419
 Id. at 802. 
 
420
 Id. at 802-03 (citing Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 
(1989)). 
 
421
 Id. at 804. 
 
422
 Id. at 804-06. 
 
423
 Manning v. Manning, 508 S.E.2d 157 (Ga. 1998). 
 
424
 Id. at 158. 
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the defendant was required to transfer certain assets to the victim.425  At the time of 
the victim’s death in 1995 at the hands of the ex-husband/criminal defendant, some 
of the designated assets still had not been transferred.426  The administrator of the 
victim’s estate sued for wrongful death, seeking an injunction against the criminal 
defendant’s removal of those assets.427  The trial court granted the injunction, 
freezing all of the defendant’s assets and ordering the defendant to separate his 
property and to transfer certain property to the estate of the victim.428  The Georgia 
Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the injunction was not made for the purpose 
of freezing assets to secure remedies that might be awarded to the victim’s estate.429  
Rather, it was to prevent disposal of assets already belonging to the victim’s 
estate.430   The high court held that there were no Sixth Amendment problems 
because the assets were not rightfully in the possession of the criminal defendant.431 
A very different issue arises when non-obligated assets are sought postindictment 
to secure later crime victim recovery.  No issue would arise, however, when the 
seizure of some assets would not impair a defendant’s access to counsel of choice 
because he or she has sufficient other assets.  A crime victim might attempt to avoid 
Sixth Amendment issues by bringing civil actions with judgments that are related to 
specific property before criminal charges are filed. 
IV.  SECURING BETTER MONETARY RECOVERIES FOR CRIME VICTIMS  
Crime victims often have both constitutional and statutory recovery rights.  
Recoveries may be available from the criminal perpetrators, whether or not charged, 
or from the government.  Recoveries are available in three settings: civil claims, 
administrative or special court proceedings, and criminal cases.  Too often, 
recoveries are difficult to secure and judgments are difficult to enforce.  This is 
especially troubling where recovery rights are constitutionally-recognized and self-
executing.  There may be ways in which crime victim recoveries can be better 
facilitated without infringing upon the rights of the criminally accused. 
With recoveries available in civil, administrative or special court, and criminal 
settings, crime victims can be confused about their recovery options.  Without 
altering existing guidelines, all recovery options should generally be presented 
together somewhere, or at least cross-referenced.  Handbooks on crime victim rights, 
including possible recovery avenues, should always be distributed to victims of 
significant crimes.  Websites outlining possible options should be established and 
publicized. 
Recovery avenues also differ significantly among states, which adds to the 
confusion.  Variations exist on such important issues as who is a victim, how much a 
victim may recover, from whom a victim may recover, and how recovery orders are 
                                                          
 
425
 Id. 
 
426
 Id. 
 
427
 Id. 
 
428
 Id. 
 
429
 Id. 
 
430
 Id. 
 
431
 Id. (citing Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 626). 
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enforced.  While interstate differences are inevitable and not in themselves 
particularly troublesome, some state crime victim recovery avenues are simply 
inadequate.  Especially troublesome are schemes failing to deliver on state 
constitutional promises.  Inadequate state laws in one state can be rectified, often 
easily, by following successful approaches employed by other states. 
Another option to improve crime victim recovery is encouraging, if not 
obligating, more trial judges in state criminal cases to consider crime victim 
recoveries, especially when entertaining proposed plea agreements.  In federal 
district courts and many state courts, assigned trial judges are prohibited from 
participating in discussions leading to possible plea agreements.432  Trial judges, 
however, must typically address criminal defendants in open court before accepting 
guilty pleas.433  At times, judges must inform the defendants of the judicial authority 
to order restitution and of possible forfeiture.434  But in Arizona, a trial judge may 
only accept a “tendered negotiated plea” after “considering the victim’s view.”435  
Other states should follow Arizona by expressly requiring that pleas be conditioned 
on judicial consideration of possible crime victim recoveries.  The jurisdictional 
powers of major state trial courts present fewer barriers to more complete hearings 
than exist for the federal district courts,436 as the former often have state 
constitutional authority over all justiciable matters while the latter are constrained by 
Congressional acts.437   
                                                          
 
432
 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c) (“The court must not participate in [plea agreement] 
discussions.”); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 25.3(a) (“The judge shall not participate in plea 
discussions.”).  But see ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.4(a) (“At the request of either party, or sua 
sponte, the court may, in its sole discretion, participate in settlement discussions . . . .  The 
trial judge shall only participate . . . with the consent of the parties.  In all other cases, the 
discussions shall be before another judge or a settlement division.”). 
 
433
 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (“Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the 
defendant may be placed under oath, and the court must address the defendant personally in 
open court.”); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 24.4 (“The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere from a defendant without first addressing the defendant personally . . . .”); ARIZ. R. 
CRIM. P. 17.2 (“Before accepting a plea of guilty or no contest, the court shall address the 
defendant personally in open court . . . .”). 
 
434
 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(J)-(K); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(I) (“The court may 
not accept a plea of guilty without first, by addressing the defendant . . . in open court, 
informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands . . . the court’s 
authority to order restitution.”).  But see CONN. SUP. CT. R. § 39-19 (no information on either 
restitution or forfeiture must be conveyed); PA. CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL RULES COMM., 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO PA. RS. CRIM. P. 550 (PLEAS OF GUILTY BEFORE MAGISTERIAL 
DISTRICT JUDGE IN COURT CASES) AND 590 (PLEAS AND PLEA AGREEMENTS) (2009) (requiring 
admonishments to the defendant about fines, but not about restitution or forfeiture). 
 
435
 ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.4(d).  See also id. at 7.4(a) (Before any plea discussions, “the 
prosecutor shall afford the victim an opportunity to confer with the prosecutor concerning a 
non-trial or non-jury trial resolution.”). 
 
436
 In considering all related harms, state trial judges need not resolve all controversies.  
Rather, they should employ discretionary factors, not unlike those used with federal district 
court supplemental jurisdictional, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West 2010). 
 
437
 Compare ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9, with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
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In other words, criminal trial judges should usually only accept pleas when 
assured that crime victims were educated about possible recoveries.  Where state 
constitutional interests exist, possible crime victim recoveries should be considered 
in even greater detail.  Such considerations might include whether hearings are 
needed, perhaps with juries, on disputed facts related to recoveries.438  It seems that 
these hearings would be conducted under different procedures in different states, 
given, for example, the differences in state constitutional civil jury trial rights.439  
Whether or not based upon a plea agreement, at sentencing a criminal defendant 
typically has no constitutional right to a jury determination of disputes over crime 
victim recoveries.440 
Furthermore, priority should be given to victims over competing governmental 
claims to a property, especially where there are strong state constitutional or 
statutory crime victim recovery interests.  The California policy, recognizing crime 
victim priority in the distribution of property subject to forfeiture, should be broadly 
followed.441  
There should also be provisional remedies available that help assure the later 
availability of assets for crime victim recoveries.  Remedies should be available in a 
related civil suit or as a supplemental matter in a criminal case.442  States should 
follow the Pennsylvania policy allowing prosecutors to seek a “temporary restraining 
order” where “there is probable cause to believe that the property with respect to 
which the order is sought appears to be necessary to satisfy an anticipated restitution 
                                                          
 
438
 The need to resolve disputed factual issues related to possible federal court recoveries 
could prompt jury trial rights.  See Cassell Testimony, supra note 115, at 18-19 (analyzing 
federal criminal and civil trial jury rights). 
 
439
 The federal constitutional civil jury trial right is inapplicable in state court proceedings.  
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875).  State civil juries often operate quite differently than 
federal civil juries.  See N.D. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“All verdicts must be unanimous.”); OHIO 
CONST. art. I, § 5 (civil case juries with three-fourths majority may be legislatively 
authorized); PA. CONST. art. I, § 6 (civil case juries with five-sixths majority may be 
legislatively authorized). 
 
440
 See In re State ex rel. T.L.B., 218 P.3d 534, 537-38 (Okla. Civ. App. 2009) (holding 
that a denial of a jury trial on the matter of restitution did not violate the Sixth Amendment, as 
restitution is not an additional punishment and the Seventh Amendment was not violated as 
restitution in a criminal case is an equitable proceeding and not a suit at common law, and that 
the jury right provided under the Oklahoma Constitution was not violated because restitution 
is an equitable remedy and not an independent civil proceeding); Illinois v. Lowe, 606 N.E.2d 
1167, 1172-73 (Ill. 1992) (holding that criminal defendant did not have a right to a jury trial 
on the matter of restitution, though other process rights are afforded the defendant in disputes 
about restitution at sentencing). 
 
441
 CAL. PENAL CODE §502.01(g)(1) (West 2010) (“If the defendant is found to have the 
only valid interest in the property subject to forfeiture, it shall be distributed as follows . . . .  
First, to the victim, if the victim elects to take the property as full or partial restitution for 
injury, victim expenditures, or compensatory damages . . . .”).   
 
442
 Professor Cassell has urged that “Congress should adopt legislation giving courts 
greater power, at the request of prosecutors, to secure assets that could be used to reimburse 
victims for their losses from federal crimes,” after reviewing a General Accounting Office 
study showing that after crimes and before criminal court judgments, “criminals . . . 
commonly dissipate their criminal gains quickly and in an untraceable manner.”  Cassell 
Testimony, supra note 115, at 25-26. 
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order.”443  In California, the “prosecuting agency” can seek to “prevent dissipation or 
secreting of assets or property” any time during a criminal case.444  Typically, state 
criminal court judges have jurisdictional authority over what amounts to civil case 
provisional remedies.  Both civil and criminal adjudicatory powers are vested in the 
same trial judges in most major American state trial courts.  As a result, in general 
jurisdiction state trial courts criminal contempt proceedings typically can be initiated 
in civil cases for civil litigation misconduct.  Similarly, settlements between crime 
victims and criminal defendants in criminal cases should be able to resolve many 
related civil claims.    
Another proposal for improvement is a more clearly defined role of the 
prosecutor in assisting the crime victim to recover in criminal cases.  As suggested 
by Oregon’s Restitution Task Force, written policies and procedures, reviews by 
supervising attorneys, and performance reviews will greatly assist crime victims.445  
A crime victim often has an opportunity to recover for crime-related losses during a 
criminal case.  Yet the role of the victim in the criminal proceeding, and thus the 
chance for recovery, is often too limited.  In Arizona, for example, a crime victim 
has a constitutional446 and statutory447 interest in restitution in a criminal case.  
However, the victim may not direct the prosecution to go forward with a criminal 
proceeding.448  This seems right.  But when there is a criminal case with 
                                                          
 
443
 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9728(f) (West 2010).  See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.532 
(West 2010) (prosecutors can obtain an order directed to a financial institution to freeze the 
assets of an accused felon for the purpose of  ensuring restitution to the victims when there is 
probable cause that the account holder was involved in the commission of the felony and 
when the loss is $10,000 or more); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-601(1) (West 2010) (“Prior to 
or at the time a criminal information, indictment charging a violation, or a petition alleging 
delinquency is filed, or at any time during the prosecution of the case, a prosecutor may, if in 
the prosecutor’s best judgment there is a substantial likelihood that a conviction will be 
obtained and restitution will be ordered in the case, petition the court to . . . (a) enter a 
temporary restraining order, an injunction, or both; (b) require the execution of a satisfactory 
performance bond; or (c) take any other action to preserve the availability of property which 
may be necessary to satisfy an anticipated restitution order.”); id. § 77-38a-601(2)(a) (“[T]he 
court may take action as requested by the prosecutor if the court determines: (i) there is 
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the defendant committed 
it, and that failure to enter the order will likely result in the property being sold, distributed, 
exhausted, destroyed, or removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise be made 
unavailable for restitution . . . .”). 
 
444
 CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.11(e)(2). 
 
445
 See AUDIT, supra note 291, at 9. 
 
446
 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1 (“[A] victim of crime has a right . . . [t]o be present . . . [t]o 
confer with the prosecution . . . [t]o receive prompt restitution . . . .”). 
 
447
 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4438 (West 2010) (“In order to assure that any victim . . . 
has been advised of the victim’s constitutional rights . . . a judge . . . shall make the following 
statement: . . . you are advised that you have rights . . . that, among others, include [the right] 
to be present at court proceedings . . . and to receive restitution from a person who is 
convicted of causing your loss.”). 
 
448
 Id. § 13-441(c) (“The right of the victim to confer with the prosecuting attorney does 
not include the authority to direct the prosecution of the case.”).  See also ALA. CODE § 15-23-
66 (West 2010) (“The rights of the victim do not include the authority to direct the 
prosecution of the case.”). 
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compensable harm to a victim, the crime victim may not always be able to pursue 
recovery easily, even when armed with statutory, if not constitutional, authority.449  
Some states create separate causes of action for willful failures by government to 
ensure crime victim rights.450  Other states expressly declare that a crime victim does 
not have a claim involving any such failures.451  While a victim should not have the 
                                                          
 
449
 See Simmons v. Florida, 974 So.2d 531 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (even with proof of 34 
stolen ladders, a defendant charged with stealing two ladders cannot be sentenced to pay for 
the other 32; no discussion of possible ancillary jurisdiction); AUDIT, supra note 291, at 9 
(“For example, some district attorneys have chosen not to prosecute certain crimes such as 
misdemeanor thefts.  Consequently, victims of these crimes are not entitled to restitution and 
may never be compensated for their losses.”). 
 
450
 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4437(A)-(B) (“The victim has standing to seek an 
order, to bring a special action or to file a notice of appearance in an appellate proceeding 
seeking to enforce any right or to challenge an order denying any right guaranteed to victims 
under the victims’ bill of rights, article II, § 2.1 . . . .  In asserting any right, the victim has the 
right to be represented by personal counsel at the victim’s expense . . . .  A victim has a right 
to recover damages from a governmental entity responsible for the intentional, knowing or 
grossly negligent violation of the victim’s rights . . . .”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-11 (West 
2010) (“If a person acting under color of state law willfully or wantonly fails to perform duties 
so that the rights in this chapter are not provided, an action for injunctive relief, including 
prospective injunctive relief, may be brought . . . .”).  Illinois employs a good faith standard.  
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/4(a)(10) (West 2010) (“Crime victims shall have the 
following rights . . . [t]he right to restitution.”); id. 120/9 (“This Act does not . . . grant any 
person a cause of action for damages or attorneys fees.  Any act of omission or commission by 
any law enforcement officer . . . or State’s Attorney . . . or other State agency . . . acting in 
good faith in rendering crime victim’s assistance . . . shall not impose civil liability . . . .”). 
 
451
 MO. ANN. STAT. § 595.209(1)(11) (West 2010) (“The following rights shall 
automatically be afforded to victims of dangerous felonies . . . victims of murder in the first 
degree . . . victims of voluntary manslaughter . . . and, upon written request, the following 
rights shall be afforded to victims of all other crimes . . . .  For victims, to be informed by the 
prosecuting attorney of the right to restitution which shall be enforceable in the same manner 
as any other cause of action as otherwise provided by law . . . .”); id. § 595.218 (“Nothing . . . 
shall be construed as creating a cause of action on behalf of any person against any public 
employee, public agency, the state or any agency responsible for the enforcement of rights and 
provisions . . . .”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1107 (West 2010) (while Arkansas does not 
appear to explicitly give a right to restitution or compensation, this statute, found in the Rights 
of Victims of Crime subchapter in the Criminal Procedure Statutes, states that “a law 
enforcement agency responsible for investigating a crime . . . shall promptly give in writing to 
the victim . . . [a]n explanation of the victim’s rights . . . [and] [i]nformation concerning the 
availability of . . . [c]ompensation for victims . . . .”);  id. § 16-90-1102 (found in the Rights of 
Victims of Crime Subchapter of the Judgment and Sentence Generally Chapter in the Criminal 
Procedure Generally Statutes) (“Failure to comply . . . does not create a claim for 
damages . . . .”); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“In all criminal prosecutions, a victim, as the 
General Assembly may define by law, shall have the following rights: . . . the right to 
restitution which shall be enforceable in the same manner as any other cause of action or as 
otherwise provided by law . . . .”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-85g (West 2010) (“In order to 
ensure that any victim coming before the court has been advised of the victim’s constitutional 
rights, any judge of the Superior Court shall . . . issue the following advisement: ‘If you are a 
victim of a crime with a case pending before this court, you are advised that you have the right 
. . . to restitution . . . .’”); id. § 54-224 (“[T]he state or any agent, employee or officer thereof 
shall not be liable for (1) the failure to afford the victim of a crime any of the rights provided 
. . . .”). 
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right to direct the prosecution, states should follow the Alabama policy requiring 
prosecutors to make reasonable efforts to confer with victims about possible plea 
agreements.452  Such conferences could typically include discussions of available 
avenues of recovery as well as possible recovery in the pending case. 
A crime victim’s opportunity to pursue recovery in a criminal case can also be 
facilitated through independent offices designed to aid crime victims.  Utah, for 
example, has a victims’ rights committee.453  That committee helps enforce crime 
victim rights, including monetary recoveries inside and outside of pending criminal 
cases.454  
States can also facilitate crime victim recoveries by making available and 
encouraging the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms before criminal 
pleas are finalized.  For example, a state could invite a crime victim to mediation, as 
in Delaware where a crime victim can pursue restitution in a nonadversarial 
environment.455  Victim offender mediation programs have been described as 
“empowering victims” and “promoting restitution to the victim.”456  It has also been 
said that such programs increase crime victim recoveries because restorative justice 
practices, such as victim-offender mediation, have substantially higher compliance 
and collection rates than judicial orders.457   
                                                          
 
452
 ALA. CODE § 15-23-71 (“The victim has the right to be present at any proceeding at 
which a negotiated plea for the person accused of committing the criminal offense against the 
victim will be presented to the court.  The court shall not accept a plea agreement unless: (1) 
The prosecuting attorney advises the court that, before requesting the negotiated plea, 
reasonable efforts were made to confer with the victim.  (2) Reasonable efforts are made to 
give the victim notice of . . . the terms of any sentence agreed to as part of the negotiated 
plea . . . .”). 
 
453
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-37-5. 
 
454
 Id. § 77-38-11 (“[A]ny Victims’ Rights Committee . . . may . . . bring an action for 
declaratory relief or for a writ of mandamus defining or enforcing the rights of victims and the 
obligations of government entities . . . [and] petition to file an amicus brief in any court in any 
case affecting crime victims . . . .”). 
 
455
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9501(b) (West 2010) (“It is the intent of the General 
Assembly that each program established . . . [s]timulate the establishment and use of victim-
offender mediation programs to help meet the need for alternatives to the courts for the 
resolution of certain criminal offenses, whether before or after adjudication . . . .”); id. § 
9501(a) (“The General Assembly finds and declares that . . . [t]he resolution of felony, 
misdemeanor and juvenile delinquent disputes can be costly and complex . . . [and] [v]ictim-
offender mediation programs can meet the needs of Delaware’s citizens by providing forums 
in which persons may voluntarily participate in the resolution of certain criminal 
offenses . . . .”).  See also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.13 (West 2010) (“The victim 
services division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice shall . . . provide mediation 
services . . . if requested by a victim . . . .”). 
 
456
 Dickman, supra note 129, at 1715 (quoting Nancy Lucas, Restitution, Rehabilitation, 
Prevention and Transformation: Victim Offender Mediation for First-Time Non-Violent 
Youthful Offenders, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1365, 1375 (2001)). 
 
457
 Id. at 1715 (citing Mark S. Unbreit, Mediating Victim-Offender Conflict: From Single-
Site to Multi-Site Analysis in the U.S., in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON TRIAL: PITFALLS AND 
POTENTIALS OF VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION - INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES 431, 
432-36 (Heinz Messmer & Hans-Uwe Otto eds. 1992)). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Crime victim recoveries are typically available in American states through three 
separate, but related, avenues: a criminal case (with or without a formal charge); a 
related civil case (including a presuit settlement); and a related administrative or 
special court proceeding.  Multiple avenues can be pursued simultaneously.  These 
avenues often have constitutional as well as statutory foundations. 
Unfortunately, crime victims often go without recovery.  Barriers to recovery 
include intrastate and interstate confusion over terms like restitution and victim, 
failures to recognize constitutional rights as self-executing, and the unavailability of 
provisional remedies.  
More can be done for victims, especially during criminal case sentencing, to 
overcome these barriers.  Unlike federal district courts, state criminal courts typically 
have general jurisdictional authority allowing broader opportunities for crime victim 
recoveries at the close of criminal cases.  Better crime victim recovery procedures 
are especially warranted where there are constitutional interests.  Enhanced 
procedures should include mandated considerations of crime victim interests at 
criminal case sentencing; broader opportunities for provisional remedies; priorities 
for crime victims when the assets of perpetrators are limited; and independent crime 
victim assistance officers.    
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